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I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1928, California courts repeatedly affirmed that water
rights were vested property, subject to divestment only upon just
compensation. With the exception of disputes between riparians and
appropriators, exercise of all such water rights was subject to rea-
sonable use limitations. Under this reasonable use doctrine, courts
required reasonable efficiencies, in light of community standards and
long-standing traditions, to prevent waste. Where a riparian or prior
appropriator reasonably exercised its right, the courts did not require
such users to bear expensive costs of improving their water use
efficiency in order to make additional water available to subsequent
users.
In 1928, however, the people of California adopted a constitutional
amendment now known as article X, section 2. On its face, that
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amendment merely extended the existing reasonable use restrictions
to all water users, including conflicts between riparians and appro-
priators. However, in the sixty years subsequent to the 1928 amend-
ment, the courts have seized upon it to redefine the meaning and
scope of the property interest in water. In particular, the courts have
used the reasonableness doctrine alone, or in conjunction with the
public trust doctrine, to authorize broad judicial or administrative
reallocation of water resources without triggering constitutional re-
quirements for due process and payment of just compensation.
This article compares the differences in express judicial treatment
of property rights in water before and after the 1928 amendment. In
particular, it focuses on several decisions from the last twenty years
that discuss reasonable use in light of changing social perceptions of
proper resource allocation. Since the California courts show no great
reluctance towards judicial redefinition of property interests in water,
the only possible limitation on further reallocations by judicial fiat
may be the United States Constitution. The article concludes by
raising some initial questions which must be addressed in any takings
or due process analysis under the federal Constitution.
II. TE NATURE OF PROPERTY INTERESTS
A starting point in a discussion of "property" interests in water
rights is some understanding of the meaning of "property." While
philosophers and economists debate the theories' of property, and
anthropologists and sociologists critique its origins,2 to the person on
1. Scholars have classified property theories into various groupings. In his standard text
used in many first year law classes, Cribbet describes five theories justifying private property:
"the occupation theory, the natural rights theory, the labor theory, the legal theory, and the
social utility theory." J. CRIBBETT, PRINCI'LES OF Tim LAW OF PROPERTY 6 (1975). See
SELmAN, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, 131-34 (1905). Laveleye, a 19th Century author, described
four theories of the origin of property: the occupancy theory, the labor theory, the contract
theory, and the utility theory. LAvELEYE, PRIMITIVE PROPERTY 346-47 (1878), quoted in 2 J.
SAcKMAN & P. ROHAN, NICHOLS' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, at 5-14 to 5-22 (3d. ed., rev.
(1985)) [hereinafter NICOrGLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN]. In his landmark article, Property, Utility,
and Fairness, Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1165 (1967) [hereinafter Michelman], Professor Michelman reduced the categories to
three: a "Desert and Personality" theory, a "Social Function" theory and "Utilitarian
Theories." Id. at 1202-13.
2. See, e.g., NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note I, at 5-11 to 5-13 (citing
THuRNWALD, ECONOaICS IN PRIMITIVE Cozm-uNrrms (1932); HmaSKOvrrs, THm ECONOMIC Ln
OF PRmrvE PEOPLES (1940); DIXON, ECONOMIC INsTITuToNs AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1941);
Hallowell, The Nature and Function of Property as a Social Institution, I J. LEO. & POL.
Soc. 115 (1943)). See also Property, 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 528 (1934) (tracing
the history of property).
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the street, "property" normally constitutes objects, such as land or
personal possessions . Within American jurisprudence, however,
"property" has a broader meaning. Indeed, "property" may have a
multitude of meanings. For example, property may mean one thing
for welfare reimbursement purposes, 4 another in a division of marital
assets, 5 another in a licensing context, 6 and still another for purposes
of the due process and "takings" provisions of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the United States Constitution. 7
Because this article focuses on the redefinition of property rights
in water, some definitions will provide a point of origin. Various
formulations exist for a comprehensive legal definition of "prop-
erty." For example, in the Restatement of Property, "property"
denotes "legal relations between persons with respect to a thing." 8
Alternatively, legal lexicographers have defined "property" as "an
aggregate of rights which are guaranteed and protected by the
government" 9 and "that dominion or indefinite right of use, control,
and disposition which one may lawfully exercise over particular things
3. See, e.g., J. Camamr, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See, e.g., County of San Diego v. Muniz, 22 Cal. 3d 29, 36-37, 583 P.2d 109, 148
Cal. Rptr. 584, 588 (1978).
5. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App. 3d 446, 461, 152 Cal. Rptr. 668,
677-78 (1979).
6. See, e.g., Belle' Isle v. Hempy, 206 Cal. App. 2d 14, 16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 599, 600
(1962).
7. The fifth amendment's two property clauses state:
No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment's property clause states:
No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law ....
Id. amend. XIV, § 1. The fifth amendment's prohibition against takings of private property
without just compensation became applicable to the states, through the fourteenth amendment,
in Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897). The meaning of "property"
for purposes of these amendments is much debated and discussed more fully infra at notes
303-46 and accompanying text.
8. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY, Introductory Note to Chapter 1,
at 3 (1936). Chapter 1 of the Restatement contains 13 basic definitions. The Restatement,
however, does not devote a specific definitional section to "property." Section 5 however,
defines "interest" to mean: "both generically [as including] varying aggregates of rights,
privileges, powers and immunities and distributively to mean any one of them." Id. § 5, at
9. In the comment to section 5, the Restatement describes "complete property" as:
The totality of [the] rights, privileges, powers and immunities which it is legally
possible for a person to have with regard to a given piece of land, or with regard
to a thing other than land, that are other than those which all other members of
society have as such.. . .This totality varies from time to time, and from place to
place, either because of changes in the common law, or because of alterations by
statute.
Id. Comment e, at 11.
9. BLAcK's LAW DicTIONARY 1382 (4th ed., rev. 1968).
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or objects."' 0 Professor Michelman defines "property" even more
broadly as "the pattern of behavioral assumptions and ethical values
which have come to be associated with institutions dictating some
degree of permanence of distribution."'"
An abstract definition of property, however, rapidly appears un-
satisfying since it merely begs the question: What are the particular
interests which the law recognizes as protected rights? 2 More useful
than a definition of "property" is a description of the primary
attributes of "property." While the exact composition of property
rights may well differ with respect to different things or entities, or
to the same things or entities but under the laws of different juris-
dictions, several fundamental attributes are shared by all species of
private property.
Among the commentators who have elaborated upon the funda-
mental attributes of property, Dean Roscoe Pound has summarized
six fundamental incidents of ownership 3 outlined by 19th century
analytical jurists. First, ownership included a right of possession or
complete physical control of a thing until dispossession voluntarily
or by legal process. Second, ownership included the right to compel
legal assistance to restrain unauthorized use or possession by others.
Third, ownership included a right of use, tempered, as in the case
of cruelty to animals, by some general moral limitations. Fourth,
ownership included a right to enjoyment of the benefits or profits
produced by the right of use. Fifth, ownership included a right to
abuse or even destroy the property owned. As with the right of use,
the right of abuse was tempered by similar moral considerations and
by concerns over impairment of other owners' use of their property.
Finally, ownership entailed a power to transfer itself in whole or in
parts to others.
10. BALLENTIn'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 1009-10 (3d ed. 1969).
11. Michelman, supra note 1, at 1203 (emphasis deleted).
12. See LAUTER, THE RnPARIAN RiOGr As PROPERTY, WATER REsouRcEs AN m LAW 140-
43 (1958) [hereinafter R AmAN RiGHT AS PROPERTY]:
[N]o general definition can be framed which will give a concrete indication whether
any claim of personal interest falls within the constitutional safeguard. Although the
courts struggle valiantly to make clear the full implications of the term "property,"
its meaning is so enmeshed in centuries of Anglo-American legal development that
general definitions are misleading at best and a true working definition impossible.
Id. at 142.
13. Pound, The Changing Role of Property in American Jurisprudence, 12 UNW. Cm.
CoNT. 31, 33-34 (1953) [hereinafter Pound]. Dean Pound used six Latin terms to describe the
fundamental attributes: (1) Jus possidendi; (2) Jus prohibendi; (3) Jas utendi; (4) Jus fruendi;
(5) Jus abutendi; and (6) Jus disponendi. Id.
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More recently, Judge Oakes similarly restated property's essential
attributes. 14 Of particular importance to this article is his point that
property expressly includes an immunity from uncompensated expro-
priation by the state. s
Oakes' contemporary formulation largely reiterates Pound's ex-
pression of classical nineteenth century understanding of property.
Thus, at least superficially, little change appears in the labels applied
to property's attributes. In the last century, however, great changes
have occurred in the meaning of the individual attributes. 16 For
example, Pound's fundamental attributes of "use" and "enjoyments
of fruits of use" included any or all reasonable uses. In contrast,
courts today uphold government regulations, under the police power,
so long as they allow some (i.e., at least one) use.1 7 In the end,
description leaves the inquiry as unsettled as definition, since it, too,
begs the question as to the content and applicability of the attributes
described.
14. 1. [Ihe right of a person to possess the thing, or, in the case of incorporeal
things, to exclude others from possessing it;
2. the right to use the thing;
3. the right to manage the thing;
4. the right to the income or profits from use of the thing;
5. the right to the capital in the thing, i.e., the power to consume, waste, modify,
sell or alienate, or even destroy it;
6. the immunity from expropriation of the thing by another or the state; and
7. the power to transmit the thing by gift, bequest, or devise.
Oakes, "Property Rights" in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56 WAsH. L. REv. 583, 589
(1981) (emphasis in original) [hereinafter Oakes]. Judge Oakes drew his analysis from A.
Honore, Ownership, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 107-47 (A. Just. ed. 1961).
15. This immunity, codified in the constitutional provisions against "takings," supra note
7, was a post-revolutionary war American contribution to property law. See Note, The
Origins and Original Significance of the Just-Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
94 YAL L.J. 694 (1985).
16. For example, in Pound's vievi, 20th century jurisprudence has moved "from consid-
eration of legal rights to interests, i.e., to the reasonable expectations involved in life in
civilized society which are behind and recognized and secured by the rights." Pound, supra
note 13, at 35. Pound explores, attribute by attribute, the increasing regulatory grasp of the
state through the "socialization" of property. Id. at 37-40. For example, uses of property
"reasonable" in and of themselves may be forbidden by the state "on a weighing of more
socially advantageous possible uses of the land than the owner wishes to make." Id. at 39.
In sum, an individual's expectations as an owner of property have increasingly given way to
"a great volume of expectations of others than the owner." Id. at 36.
17. See, e.g., Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsipanny-Troy
Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 556-57, 193 A.2d 232, 241-42 (1963) (court upheld zoning laws restricting
use of undeveloped land to wild life sanctury and water retention area). See also Sibson v.
New Hampshire, 115 N.H. 124, 127, 336 A.2d 239, 243 (1975) (court upholds development
ban on marshland since property was still available for "the normal traditional uses of the
marshland including wildlife observation, hunting, harvesting of marshgrass, clam and shellfish
harvesting, and aesthetic purposes").
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An alternative to definition involves an examination of the social
functions of property. A primary social function of property is to
delineate the respective rights between an individual and other indi-
viduals or society as a whole.' 8 The history of property is etched by
the movement of that line separating individuals from state.
Judge Oakes has suggested that two fundamental attitudes towards
private property pervade American jurisprudence.' 9 One view, origi-
nally championed by James Madison, adopts the views of John
Locke and William Blackstone and equates property with individual
dominion. 20 The other view, originally championed by Thomas Jef-
ferson, views property as "a common stock for man." 2' Over the
last hundred years courts have generally moved from Madisonian
"dominion" towards Jeffersonian "common control" over natural
resources. The remainder of this article traces that movement, in
California, with respect to water.
III. CoMMoN LAW AND CIVIL LAW SouRcEs FOR PRIVATE
PROPERTY INTERESTS IN CALIFORNIA'S WATERS
California's initial water law decisions emerged shortly after the
formulation in both common and civil law jurisdictions of the
riparian theory of private property interests in water.? Although
18. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 771 (1964) ("property performs the
function of maintaining independence, dignity and pluralism in society by creating zones within
which the majority has to yield to the owner.")
19. Oakes, supra note 14, at 583-87.
20. Blackstone described property as:
[t]hat sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world and total exclusion of the right of any other individual
in the universe.
Telly, The Classical Economic Model and the Nature of Property in the 18th and 19th
Centuries, 13 TULSA L. J. 406, 414 (1978) (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES).
21. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in Tim
PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 395, 396-97 (M. Peterson ed., 1975), and quoted in Oakes, supra
note 14, at 587.
22. In two pivotal cases, a generation apart, the California Supreme Court recognized
both the prior appropriation doctrine and the riparian doctrines. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140,
146 (1855) (prior appropriation approved upon public domain lands); Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal.
255, 315, 10 P. 674, 706 (1886) (riparian rights adopted by California Legislature in 1850).
See infra notes 72-75, 94-107 and accompanying text. For a general description of the two
theories in California, see Attwater and Markle, Overview of California Water Law, 19 PAc.
L.J. 957 (1988) (also part of this Symposium). See also W. HuTrcmNs, Tan CALIFORNIA LAW
OF WATER RIGHrs, 40-55 (1956) [hereinafter W. HuTcmNs]; 1 H. ROGERS & A. NiCHOLS,
WATER FOR CALIFORNIA 156-212, at 216-304 (1967); 1 S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE VEsTERN
STATES 66-85, 123-37 (3d ed. 1911) [hereinafter WATER RIGHTS IN TH WESTERN STATES]; D.
ANDERSON, Riparian Water Rights in California, GOVmNOR'S COMmIssioN TO REViEW CALI-
FORNIA WATER RIGrrs LAw (Staff Paper No. 4, 1977) [hereinafter Anderson]; M. ARCHIBALD,
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scholars debate23 the exact ancestry of the riparian theory, both legal
systems had protected private interests in water to some extent prior
to the nineteenth century.
A. Roman and Civil Law Sources
Roman law provided two foundational elements developed by later
common and civil law courts and commentators. From Roman law
comes the fundamental distinction between ownership of the corpus
of a watercourse and the rights of use of the watercourse.7 In his
Institutes, the Emperor Justinian classified flowing water within the
"negative community" of things which cannot be owned privately.25
Appropriative Water Rights in California, GOVERwOR'S CoMMlssIoN TO REvIEW C, LIFORuA
WATER RIGHTs LAW (Staff Paper No. 1, 1977).
The riparian doctrine first took its present form in civil law countries through the Napoleonic
Code of 1804. See generally Wiel, Waters: American Law and French Authority, 33 HAgv.
L. REV. 133, 134 (1919) [hereinafter Waters: American Law & French Authority]; Wiel, Origin
and Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses in the Common Law and in the
Civil Law, 6 CAL F. L. REv. 245, 253-56 (1918) [hereinafter Comparative Development of the
Law of Water Courses]. It is generally agreed that Justice Story first popularized the term
"riparian" rights in his opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 472 (C.C.D. R.I. 1827)
(No. 14, 312). See Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses, supra, at 248-51.
The English courts did not fully develop the riparian theory until the cases of Mason v. Hill,
110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833) (rights to full natural flow), and Embrey v. Owen, 115 Eng.
Rep. 579 (Exch. Ch. 1851) (right to reasonable flow). See Comparative Development of the
Law of Watercourses, supra, at 246-47. Thus, the California Supreme Court's decision in
Irwin v. Phillips occurred only fifty-one years after the adoption of the Napoleonic Code, twenty-
eight years after Tyler v. Wilkinson, and only four years after Embrey v. Owen. Similarly,
the California Supreme Court's decision in Lux v. Haggin came only thirty-five years after
Embrey v. Owen. The specific contours of the riparian rights doctrine were still relatively fresh
when adopted by the California Supreme Court. For a broader discussion of the civil and
common law origins of recognition of private property rights and water, see infra notes 24-62,
and accompanying text.
23. 7 R. CLARK, WATERs AND WATER Rtnrs 1 (1976) [hereinafter R. CLARK]. Two major
theories exist. Wiel argued that the Napoleonic Code of 1804, as understood by Chancellor
James Kent and Justice Joseph Story, was the source of riparian doctrine; under Wiel's
formulation, a form of prior appropriation existed in England until after the English courts
adopted riparianism from the French through Justice Story's opinion in Tyler v. Wilkinson,
24 F. Cas. 477 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14, 312). See, e.g., Comparative Development of the
Law of Watercourses, supra note 22, at 245-53; R. CLARK, supra, § 1601, at 29-31. Maass
and Zobel disagree with Wiel's interpretation of 18th and 19th century English cases; they
argue for a common law origin of riparian rights and water. Maass & Zobel, Anglo-American
Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 PUB. POL'Y 109, 120-24 (1961)
[hereinafter Maass & Zobel] cited in R. CLARK, supra, at 31 n.8.
24. For a brief discussion of Roman water law as expressed in Justinian's Corpus Juris
Civilis see H. Althaus, Public Trust Rights 1-9 (1978) [hereinafter H. ALTHAus]. The Roman
law origins of the corpus/usufruct distinction has been noted by many courts. See, e.g., Lux
v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 315; Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. at 700-01.
25. H. ALTrAus, supra note 24, at 2. The Romans used several different concepts to
describe the negative community and rights to objects within such community. Res nullius
meant "property of no one." See, e.g., WATER RiGHTs IN THE WEsTERN STATEs, supra note
22, at 3. The Romans classified such members of the negative community into two principal
1038
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Yet, the Institutes26 also recognized the concept of "usufruct" -"the
right to the use, enjoyment, profits, and avails of property belonging
to another." 27 Romans enjoyed their usufructuary rights in waters as
members of the public and as individual landowners. 28
Although Roman law itself recognized usufructs, it was left to the
civilians to develop more fully the incidents of private usufructuary
rights in water. In Samuel Wiel's view, not until the Napoleonic
Code of 1804 did the civil law fully adopt the incidents of riparian
ownership. 29
groups: res communes and res pubicae. See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 315. Res
communes were "things regarded as insusceptible of private ownership by their nature."
Yiannopoulos, Common, Public and Private Things in Louisiana: Civilian Tradition and
Modern Practice, 21 LA. L. REv. 697, 699 n.15 (1961). Res publicae "were, in general, state
property serving public purposes." Id. at n.16.
A fair amount of overlap exists between "res communes," "res publicae," "res nullins."
Moreover, the distinction between the concepts, particularly as adopted by common law
authors, has not always been kept clean. For example, the 13th century English commentator
known as Bracton had trouble distinguishing between "public" and "common" things: "Note
this difference between what is public and what is common. Those things are reckoned as
public, which are enjoyable by all persons, that is, which regard the use of human beings
alone. But things may be sometimes termed common, which are enjoyable by all animals."
1 Braction, DE LEomus ET CoNsUtrUDiNmus ANGLIA, Chapter 12, 6 (Twiss ed. 1878-1883),
quoted in Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. Rv.
60, 66 n.25 (1963) [hereinafter Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine].
In addition, English common law added the concept "publici juris." See, e.g., WATER
RIGHTS IN THE WEsTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 753-54. Literally, "publici juris" means
"of public right." BALTaxrNTINE's LAW DICTIONARY 1022 (3d. ed. 1969). According to Wiel,
however, "All these phrases are primarily nothing more than expressions of the rule that the
water itself is not in its nature private property while flowing naturally, but is in a class with
the air." WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 754. For a contemporary
interpretation of "publici juris" and "res publicae" as applicable to the water provisions in
the constitutions of Wyoming and Colorado, see generally Note, Water Rights: A Question
of Ownership, 10 WAsHBURN L.J. 465 (1971). See also H. ALTHAUs, supra note 24, at 5-6
("common things were regarded as having no owner... whereas public things were regarded
as belonging to the State, or, as in the case of river banks, to private individuals"), quoting
W. HUNTER, RoimAN LAW 310 (4th ed. 1903).
26. See, e.g., INsTrIrTEs oF JusTINaIN, Book 1, titles 4-5, cited in WATER RIGHTS IN Tm
WESTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 14 n.1.
27. BAI TIN='s LAW DICTIONARY 1328 (3d ed. 1969).
28. See, e.g., Lord Denman's discussion of Roman law in Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep.
at 700-01, quoted in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 317: "no one had any property in the water
itself, except in that particular portion which he might have abstracted from the stream and
of which he had possession, and during the time of such possession only." As members of
the public, Romans were granted broad use of rivers, ports and the sea shore. See, e.g., H.
ALTRAus, supra note 24, at 4-9. See also L. TECLAFs, WATER LAW IN HIsToRICAL PERSPECTIVE
26 (1985) [hereinafter L. TEcLAIF]:
The right to use public streams was open to all who had access to them; and since
Roman law did not provide for involuntary servitude of access, it could to that
extent be considered a riparian system.
Id. See also id. at 67 n.90-91. Wiel, however, argues that attempts to find a riparian doctrine
in Roman law are inconclusive. See Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses,
supra note 22, at 254-55 n.44-45 and accompanying text.
29. Comparative Development of the Law of Watercourses, supra note 22, at 254-55.
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Usufructuary rights belonged only to the riparian proprietors for
water was not within the public domain. 0
B. Common Law Development of Property in Water
Medieval English law was more preoccupied with questions of
navigation, fishing, drainage and flood prevention than questions
involving rights to use water consumptively or to power mills. 3' Thus,
scant mention of water rights, as known today, appears in the leading
texts. 32 Nevertheless, the Roman concepts of the negative community
and the usufruct were well known in medieval England. 33 Some
tension did exist between these Roman concepts and the later English
concept that a landowner's domain extends from the depths of the
The law of watercourses did not become well established in the Civil law until the
Code Napoleon (Articles 644-645) in 1804 established the riparian doctrine in France
and in the countries upon which Napoleon forced his jurisdiction, which included,
among others, Italy and Spain.
Id. at 254-55 (footnotes omitted), quoting I PxcAan, 1 TnRM DES EAux, 203 (2d ed.).
Article 644 of the Code states:
He whose property borders on a running water course, other than that which is
declared an appurtenance of the public domain by article 538, may supply himself
from it in its passage for the irrigation of his properties. He whose estate uses water
crosses is at liberty to use it within the space which it crosses, but on condition of
restoring it, at its departure from his land to its ordinary course.
CODE CIvnL (Napoleon), art. 644 (1804), quoted as translated in Waters: American Law &
French Authority, supra note 22, at 134.
Article 645 states:
If a dispute arises between the proprietors to whom these waters may be of use, the
courts, in giving judgment, should reconcile the interest of agriculture with the
consideration due to property rights; and in all cases special and local rules upon
the flow and use of water should be observed.
CODE CriL (Napoleon), art. 645 (1804), quoted as translated in Waters: American Law &
French Authority, supra note 22, at 134.
30. Waters: American Law & French Authority, supra note 22, at 134 ("the allowance
of special right to an appropriator prior in time ... is negatived by those limitations").
While the French civilians articulated riparianism, Spanish and Mexican civilians generally
retained broader public rights in water. See L. TECLAFF, supra note 28, at 28-31. By 1813,
Spain had abolished the power of feudal lords to grant rights in public waters; by 1846, it
had installed a permit system for most uses of public waters. Id. at 28. At the time of
California's transfer to the United States, Mexico, however, retained the sovereign's right to
grant exclusive rights in water. See id. at 30-31; Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 319-22 ("[Appro-
priators under government concession] acquired an exclusive right to the use of that which
they diverted, because, if they complied with the established conditions, their rights were
required under and in accordance with law, and the waters they diverted were no longer
portions of the waters of a river, or subject to the common use.") Id. at 322.
31. Common Law Background of the Riparian Right, supra note 25, at 72.
32. See, e.g., id. at 70, 72.
33. See Murphy, English Water Law Doctrine Before 1400, 1 Am. J. LEoA. HIST. 103,
103-04 (1957); Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25, at 66, 70-
71. WATER RiGH-s i T vWsTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 4-5, 10-11.
Much of the discussion that follows draws heavily on Professor Lauer's article, The Common
Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25.
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earth to the heavens. 34 Under Blackstone's influence, however, late
18th century English law turned its attention towards articulating the
scope of the usufruct in waters.
A doctrinal choice confronted late 18th and early 19th century
English jurists between recognition of temporal priority in uses or
affirmation of equality among landowners adjoining a watercourse.
In his Commentaries,35 Blackstone developed the prior use theory.
He adopted wholeheartedly the Roman concept of the negative
community:
But, after all, there are some few things which, notwithstanding the
general introduction and continuance of property, must still una-
voidably remain in common .... Such (among others) are the
elements of light, air and water ....
A man can have no absolute permanent property in [fire, light, air
and water], as he may in the earth and land, since these are of a
vague and fugitive nature .... 36
In addition, Blackstone followed the civilians' idea of usufructuary
right of private individuals to take water. 37 To this usufructuary
principle, however, Blackstone developed his novel theories of "oc-
cupancy" and "prior use."3 "Occupancy" included some sense of
reduction into possession by an individual water user. Thus, for
34. For example, the writings of Sir Edward Coke and Sir Matthew Hale suggested that
the ownership of land encompassed the ownership of all water found upon it, including
running water and ponds. Id. at 74-76. Coke's scant mention of water rights occurred primarily
in conjunction with land ownership, "to which he applied the maxim cujus est solum, ejus
est usque ad coelum-he who owns the soil owns the sky." Id. at 74. Hale wrote largely on
principles of navigation, shipping and fishing. Id. at 76 n.85. Lauer cautions against over
generalizations from Hale's work. Id. In contrast to Coke and Hale, however, Robert Callis
drew more heavily from the Roman authors and developed a water rights theory more closely
approximating 19th century riparian rights. Id. at 76-79.
35. W. BLAcKscToN, Co?, raNTasus (1st ed. 1765-1769).
36. 2 BLACKsrOmN, COMMENTARMS, 14, 18, quoted in WATER RiGHTs IN THE WESTERN
STATES, supra note 22, at § 6-7.
37. Id.
38. Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25, at 94-99. Black-
stone's prior use doctrine arose out of the 17th century's "ancient use" doctrine. Id. at 83-
89; WATER RIGHTs IN TEm WEsTERN STATEs, supra note 22, at 736-38. As originally formulated,
this theory depended upon proof of a use from time immemorial. WATER RiGHTS IN THE
WFsTERN STATEs, supra note 22, at 736-38; Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine,
supra note 25 at 87-89. Compare Maass & Zobel, supra note 23, at 125-26 "A plaintiff
[riparian owner] need not prove prescription or a grant when bringing an action for the
obstruction of a stream." Id. at 126. Given such ancient use, the courts recognized a prescriptive
right in that user to have the watercourse flow in its ancient manner and to prohibit diversion
or impairment of the watercourse by a subsequent user. Common Law Background of the
Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25, at 84-85. The courts soon expanded the ancient rights
concept to give one using a watercourse a right: "not to have the watercourse diverted, without
regard to whether the use was ancient or the watercourse was alleged to have existed since
time out of mind, at least where the diverter could show no right to do so." Id. at 86.
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example, an individual water user "occupied" water actually with-
drawn from a watercourse, at least during the period of use.
Blackstone's theory of prior use resembles the prior appropriation
doctrine later recognized in the Western United States in the 19th
Century. 9 Under Blackstone's theory, a prior user could prevent a
later user from interfering with the quantity of water in the water-
course necessary for the prior user's mill works.
Blackstone's prior use theory was largely adopted by the English
courts in a series of decisions between 1785 and 1824.40 The cases in
this era, however, were not uniform. For example, in Wright v.
Howard,41 the court reviewed a diversion by an upstream owner to
the alleged detriment of a downstream user. In that case, the court
elaborated a "natural flow" theory:
Every proprietor has an equal right to use the water which flows
in the stream, and consequently no proprietor can have the right
to use the water to the prejudice of any other proprietor. Without
the consent of the other proprietors, who may be affected by his
operations, no proprietor can either diminish the quantity of water,
which would otherwise descend to the proprietors below, nor throw
the water back upon the proprietors above.42
The court required either an express grant or twenty years adverse
use to circumvent the natural flow right.43
39. Indeed, Wiel found much of his support for the French origins of riparianism through
Blackstone's work. Maass & Zobel, supra note 23, at 127. Maass and Zobel, however, claim
that Blackstone unnecessarily confused the laws of natural rights and easements with the law
governing the action for nuisance. Id. at 128-29.
40. Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25, at 99-104; WATER
RiGHrs IN T E WE5sTE STATEs, supra note 22, at 739-40.
41. Wright v. Howard, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (Ch. 1823).
42. Id. at 82, quoted in Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note
25, at 101-02. Maass and Zobel note Justice Story's admission of a debt to Wright v. Howard
for his formulation of the "reasonable use" theory, four years after Wright v. Howard, in
Tyler v. Wilkinson. Maass & Zobel, supra note 23, at 133. Wiel also notes Story's reliance
upon Wright v. Howard. WATER RIGHTs IN TiH WEsTERN STATEs, supra note 22, at 764-65.
43. Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note 25, at 102. Further-
more, opinions not only differed between cases but also among justices in a particular decision.
Id. at 103-04. For example, in William v. Morland, 107 Eng. Rep. 620 (K.B. 1824), though
the three judges who decided the case each used Blackstone's prior use theory, they expressed
widely different views of the doctrine's consequences. For example, Justice Bayley stated:
Flowing water is originally publicijuris. So soon as it is appropriated by an individual,
his right is coextensive with the beneficial use to which he appropriates it. Subject
to that right, all the rest of the water remains publici juris. The party who obtains
a right to the exclusive enjoyment of the water does so in derogation of the primitive
right of the public.
Id. at 621. Justice Holroyd, however, found "quasi" private property in flowing water:
Running water is not in its nature private property. At least it is private property
no longer than it remains on the soil of the person claiming it. Before it came there,
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Despite its similarities to "prior appropriation," the English "prior
use" theory was short lived. In the 1833 decision of Mason v. Hill4
4
the court adopted the natural flow doctrine asserted in Wright v.
Howard.45 In Mason v. Hill, Lord Denman extensively surveyed the
common and civil watercourse laws. He rejected the prior use doctrine
as a mistaken view of Williams v. Morland46 and a misconception
of Blackstone:
The position that the first occupant of water for a beneficial purpose
has a good title to it is perfectly true in this sense, that neither the
owner of the land below can back the water, nor the owner of the
land above divert it, to his prejudice. In this, as in other cases of
real property, possession is a good title against a wrong-doer....
But it is a very different question whether he can take from the
land below one of its natural advantages, which is capable of being
applied to valuable purposes, and generally increases the fertility of
the soil even when unapplied; and deprive him of it altogether by
anticipating him in its application to a useful purpose.
47
The natural flow theory itself was short lived. In the 1861 case of
Embrey v. Owen,48 the English jurists borrowed from American law
and limited "natural flow" rights to reasonable use. 49 Thereafter,
the riparian rights doctrine, with its reasonable use formulation,
remained an essential formulation of English common law until
replaced by a permit system in the 1960s.50
it clearly was not his property. It may, perhaps, become, quasi, the property of
another before it comes upon his premises, by reason of his having appropriated to
himself the use of the water accustomed to flow through his land before any other
person had acquired a right to it.
Id. at 621. Judge Littledale limited his discussion to a rule requiring proof of harm to prior
users: "The mere right to use the water does not give a party such a property in the new
water constantly coming, as to make the diversion or obstruction of the water, per se, give
him any right of action." Id. at 622.
Professor Lauer summarizes these divergent views: "Clearly, on the eve of the promulgation
of the riparian doctrine, the English courts were groping towards substantial new development
in the field of water use rights. Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra
note 25, at 104. See also Maass & Zobel, supra note 23, at 134-37.
44. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692 (K.B. 1833).
45. Wright v. Howard, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (Ch. 1823). See supra notes 41-43 and accom-
panying text.
46. Williams v. Morland, 107 Eng. Rep. 620 (K.B. 1824); see supra note 43 and
accompanying text.
47. Mason v. Hill, 110 Eng. Rep. 692, 698, as quoted in Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 387-
88 (emphasis in Lux). See WATER RiGHTS iN aE VEsrPR STATEs, supra note 22, at 740-43.
48. Embrey v. Owen, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (Exch. Ch. 1851).
49. Id. at 585-86. See Common Law Background of the Riparian Doctrine, supra note
25, at 107.
50. See L. TEcLAFF, supra note 28, at 16-17. Although English Constitutional law does
not guarantee compensation for compulsory acquisition of a vested common law right, courts
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C. Early Cases From the Eastern United States
Courts in the United States in the late 18th and early 19th century
matched the English struggle to adapt the laws affecting property
interests in water with the tumultuous changes brought by the in-
dustrial revolution. Prior to 1827, when Justice Story wrote Tyler v.
Wilkinson,51 a range of opinions existed in the courts of the young
American states that echoed the uncertainty in English law between
the prior use and the natural flow theories.52 Although the economic
consequences of the adapation of the competing paradigms were
profoundly different, the earliest opinions often failed to distinguish
between the two.53
In Tyler v. Wilkinson, however, Justice Story drew upon both
Chancellor Kent's civilian influenced Commentaries4 and the English
tradition 55  and gave the common law the riparian doctrine in its
first modern articulation. While largely a "natural flow" decision,56
Tyler v. Wilkinson added a "reasonable use" limitation to the rights
held by riparian properties.57
construe statutes destroying vested rights with "utmost strictness" and many statutes expressly
compensate owners of property expropriated for public use. See P. JAMs, INTRODUCTION TO
ENaLISH LAw 466-67 (10th ed. 1979).
51. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F. Cas. 477 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14, 312).
52. See Horwitz, The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law,
1780-1860, 40 U. Cm. L. Rav. 248, 249-51 (1973) [hereinafter Horwitz]. See also Maass &
Zobel, supra note 23, at 138-43 (finding strong elements of riparianism in pre-1827 Connecticut,
Massachusetts and New York decisions).
53. Horwitz, supra note 52, at 250.
54. J. KENr, Co1mtsNTA~ms ON AimiucA1 LAW (1st ed. 1828).
55. See, Appendix B, Sources of Story's Opinion, in Maass & Zobel, supra note , at 152-
56 (discussing English and American authorities for Tyler v. Wilkinson).
56. See Horwitz, supra note 52, at 256-57.
57. Justice Story stated:
When I speak of this common right, I do not mean to be understood, as holding
the doctrine, that there can be no diminution in quantity, or a retardation or
acceleration whatsoever, and no obstruction or impediment whatsoever, by a riparian
proprietor, in the use of the water as it flows; for that would be to deny any
valuable use of it. There maybe, and there must be allowed of that, which is common
to all, a reasonable use. The true test of the principle and extent of the use is,
whether it is to the injury of the other proprietors or not. There may be a diminution
of the natural current indispensable for the general and valuable use of the water,
perfectly consistent with the existence of the common right.
24 F. Cas. at 474. He continued:
The law here, as in many other cases, acts with a reasonable reference to public
convenience and general good, and it is not betrayed into a narrow strictness,
subversive of common sense, nor into an extravagant looseness, which would destroy
private rights. The maxim is applied, "Sic utere tuo, ut non alienum laedas."
Id.
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Soon after the announcement of the "reasonable use" limitation,
courts began to articulate its meaning. Evidence suggests that Justice
Story practically equated "reasonable use" with "natural flow"
rights. 5 Thus, absent a prescriptive right in a competing user, a
riparian owner could prohibit any subsequent upstream use that led
to any harm not labeled "de minimis." 9
Later, the courts began to recognize the concept of proportionate
use. Under this view, each riparian user had a right to a reasonable
share of the water; that reasonable use was determined according to
all the circumstances prevailing on the watercourse. This entailed a
balancing of uses and made " 'reasonable use' of a stream 'depend
on the extent of detriment to the riparian proprietors below.' "6 For
a time, other Eastern courts went even further. These courts rejected
proportionality in favor of a more utilitarian "community needs and
wants" theory.6' Other courts used some variants of priority theories.
Ultimately, however, the Eastern states rejected priority as encour-
aging monopoly; the perceived competitive advantages from a rea-
sonableness doctrine based on proportionate use became the hallmark
of post-Civil War riparian rights in the East.62
IV. TRADrrIoNAL JUDICIAL ATrrTuDEs iN CALIFORNIA Tow nDs
PROPERTY INTERESTS IN WATER
If the California courts in 1850 only had to decipher the tangled
changes in the law of watercourses produced by rapid industrialization
in the water rich eastern United States and England, their task would
still have been great. As described above, the law in those areas was
still evolving at the time of California's statehood. Although riparian
rights were now recognized by name, uncertainty existed as to whether
those rights entailed undiminished natural flow, or natural flow
beyond a de minimis diminution, or some proportionate theory of
water use. Moreover, vestiges existed of both "prior use-," with its
suggestion of temporal priority, and pure utilitarianism, with its
suggestions of allocation according to political or economic agenda.
58. Horwitz, supra note 52, at 257 n.25.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 259 (quoting Snow v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459, 462 (1858)).
61. Id. at 259-61.
62. Id. Additionally, the American courts began to attack the English notion of prescriptive
rights to water use based on ancient use. Id. at 264-70. The courts rejected mere ancient use
and required an adverse use, i.e., legal injury or practical inconvenience. Id. at 267-68. This
reformation further weakened the monopolistic tendencies of appropriative rights. Id.
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Additionally, changes in the theory of prescriptive use were under
way.
To this great tumult, California's unique circumstances added three
new elements. First, the Gold Rush had effectively visited upon the
State a period of near lawlessness.63 In conjunction with the transition
between rule by Mexico and the United States, the applicable law,
much less its enforcement, was uncertain. Moreover, in place of de
jure rule, miners' customs had developed as a de facto law. Second,
most of the land in California was held publicly 4 Thus, English
common law rules regarding privileges of real property owners were
not direct precedent. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the largely
arid western climate made competition over water fierce.65 With the
advent of hydraulic mining,66 great works were constructed to store
and transport water over often large distances for uses neither on
riparian land nor traditionally recognized as pertaining to riparian
rights. Against this backdrop of tremendous change and novelty,
early California jurists were confronted with establishing the nature
of rights to the use and development of California's waters.
A complete analysis of property rights in California's water re-
sources would entail a full description of all the incidents of own-
ership recognized under riparianism and prior appropriation. Such a
task is beyond the scope of this article and, indeed, has already been
outlined above in another contribution to this Symposium. 6 Instead,
the following section of this article focuses on two primary aspects
of the history of judicial protection of private property interests in
California's water resources. First, we catalog those statements from
the 19th and early 20th century cases indicating express judicial
recognition of private property interests in water. These statements
set the tone for the sweeping changes occurring in judicial attitudes
after 1928. Second, we explore the contours of the reasonableness
doctrine, and prevention of waste, as developed prior to 1928. As
will be discussed more fully below, this doctrine has been the fulcrum
63. See Shaw, The Development of the Law of Waters in the West, 10 CALIF. L. REV.
443, 445-47 (1922), reprinted in 189 Cal. 779, 781-783 (1922) [hereinafter cited as Shaw]. For
an interesting property theory based upon the cost of violence to miners during the Gold
Rush, see, J. UMBECK, A THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: WITH APPLICATION TO THE CALIFORNIA
GOLD RuSH (1981) [hereinafter J. UMBECK].
64. Shaw, supra note 63, at 446-47, 189 Cal. at 781, 783.
65. Shaw, supra note 63, at 445-46, 189 Cal. at 780-81.
66. J. UMBECK, supra note 63, at 76.
67. See Attwater & Markle, 19 PAC. L.J. 957 (1988). See also authorities cited supra note
22.
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upon which post-1928 judicial decisions have shifted control of water
resources from private to public administration. The reasonableness
doctrine was well defined prior to 1928, but, as we will show, it had
not been used to divest water rights holders of their beneficial uses
of water.
A. Express Judicial Recognition of Private Property Interests in
Water
1. From Prior Appropriation to Recognition of Riparian Rights
Against the common law riparian doctrine and the prior appro-
priation doctrine, the "California doctrine" 68 of water rights devel-
oped over a thirty year period in the mid-19th century. As it initially
emerged, the doctrine attempted to recognize broad private interests
in water resources. Unlike the English courts, which chose between
prior use and riparianism, the California courts recognized two
distinct sets of property interests: riparian and appropriative rights.
The tension between these two sets of rights grew until they reached
their climax with Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Com-
pany.6 9 At least during the law's formative years, however, the cases
discussing the two sets of rights demonstrate great judicial concern
with protecting private interests in water from impairment by other
private or public interests.
The development of water law in California occurred in several
distinct phases. The first phase began with the Gold Rush. Against
the common law riparian background, the California courts were
asked to address an entire set of questions not theretofore decided.
70
While riparian rights were incidents of common law ownership of
land, California miners had mere possession, not title to, public
domain land largely owned by the federal government. Facing dis-
putes between water users on these public lands, the courts had their
initial opportunity to define property rights in California water.
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court had a clear choice: either
adopt the miners' customs, which recognized a priority based upon
time of putting water to use,71 or adapt the riparian doctrine to the
68. The California doctrine entails the blend of appropriative and riparian rights. See
WATER RIGHTS IN THE WEsTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 744.
69. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926).
70. See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 63, 189 Cal. at 182-84.
71. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140, 146 (1855).
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unique circumstances of mining district disputes. The court chose the
former.
Judicial recognition in California of private property interests in
water began in 1855 with Irwin v. Phillips.2 In that case, the court
ruled that between two users of water on public domain lands, the
user first in time held the superior right.73 By recognizing the prior
appropriation doctrine, the court began the long line of cases still
evolving today that determines the relative contours of this appro-
priative right.
The court's decision in Irwin was quite sensible under the circum-
stances. First, the court's creation of appropriatve rights accommo-
dated the common law's protection of possessory rights to the
exigencies of California's mining districts. A few of the early cases
involve disputes between appropriators and users who possessed land
-albeit without the benefits of title-along the banks of a water-
course. 74 Thus, the courts could have directly adapted riparianism,
at least in such instances, and given the streamside squatter a priority.
But most of the early disputes were strictly between two appropriators
using water far from its point of diversion. In these cases, the
riparian doctrine's "natural rights" and "natural benefits" to the
land were inappropriate, since the waters were not being used on
lands past which they naturally flowed.
The court's decision also preserved the status quo. Miners had
themselves accepted the first in time, first in right, system. Thus, the
courts were merely confirming working understandings already prev-
alent in the mining districts. Upholding the importance of certainty
to property law, the courts chose to maintain a system already well
in place. 75
72. Id.
73. Id. at 147. The court quoted equity's maxim: "qui prior est in tempore potior est injure." Id. ("He who is first in time is first in right." BALLaNME's LAw DicIoNARY 1043
(3d ed. 1969)) The court elaborated:
The miner, who selects a piece of ground to work, must take it as he finds it,
subject to prior rights, which have an equal equity, on account of an equal recognition
from the sovereign power. If it is upon a stream the waters of which have not been
taken from their bed, they cannot be taken to his prejudice; but if they have been
already diverted, and for as high, and legitimate a purpose as the one he seeks to
accomplish, he has no right to complain, no right to interfere with the prior
occupation of his neighbor, and must abide the disadvantages of his own selection.
5 Cal. at 147. The court's discussion of the equal value of the purposes made by the junior
and senior appropriators suggests that a junior appropriator who diverted for a "higher"
purpose might have some superior right. No subsequent decision, however, has followed this
suggestion.
74. See, e.g., Crandall v. Woods, 8 Cal. 136 (1857).
75. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. at 146 (miners' appropriative system had "the force and
effect of resjudicata.").
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Although the courts began to recognize this new class of common
law rights as early as the 1850s, it took them several years for courts
to become comfortable with the incidents of ownership and to speak
of these rights as "property." Indeed, in its initial formulations, the
California Supreme Court only hesitantly described these interests in
water as "property." For example, in Tartar v. Spring Creek Water
& Mining Company,76 the court labeled an appropriation of water
as "a quasi private proprietorship." Likewise, in Hoffman v. Stone,78
the court recognized a "special property ' 79 in the waters appropri-
ated. The Hoffman court noted that its decisions on appropriated
waters were based on four principles: community needs, California's
unique and unprecedented circumstances, an absence of legislation,
and an intent to conform to analogous common law rules.80 The
court stated:
The fact early manifested itself, that [mines] could not be suc-
cessfully worked without a proprietorship in waters, and it was
recognized and maintained. To protect those who, by their energy,
industry, and capital, had constructed canals, and races, carrying
water for miles into parts of the country which must have otherwise
remained unfruitful and undeveloped, it was held that the first
appropriator acquired a special property in the waters thus appro-
priated, and as a necessary consequence of such property, might
invoke all legal remedies for its enjoyment or defense. A party
appropriating water, has the sole and exclusive right to use the same
for the purposes for which it was appropriated .... 11
Similarly, in Crandall v. Woods,2 decided roughly six months after
Hoffman, the court stated:
Since [Irwin v. Phillips], a special property has been recognized
in water, not in the sense in which the word property is ordinarily
used; but the Courts have held, that a right to water as a usufruct,
may be acquired by appropriation, as against a subsequent appro-
priator, who shows no title to the soil; and that by the appropriation
of water, and the construction of a canal, the party acquires an
easement or franchise, which he may enjoy and protect. If this is
an innovation upon the old rules of law upon this subject, it is
76. 5 Cal. 395 (1855).
77. Id. at 399 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the "quasi private proprietor-
ship, . . . entitles the holder to be protected in its quiet enjoyment against all the world but
the true owner . . . ." Id.
78. 7 Cal. 46 (1857).
79. Id. at 49.
80. Id. at 48.
81. Id. at 49 (emphasis added).
82. 8 Cal. 136 (1857).
1049
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
such a one as the peculiar circumstances of the country, and the
immense importance of our mining interest will justify.83
The Crandall court recognized the usufructuary nature of an appro-
priative right. Although it labeled the usufruct a "special interest,"
it described it as an "easement" or "franchise. '"8 Thus, nothing
about the right's "specialness" made it appear any less vested to the
court than an easement.
In McDonald v. Bear River & Auburn Water & Mining Co.,85
decided fours years after Irwin v. Phillips, the court considered a
dispute over ownership of water needed for a mill. The court de-
scribed the property interest in water "as a substantial and valuable
property, distinct, sometimes, from the land through which it flows
... [which right] draws to it all the legal remedies for its invasion.'816
The court further noted: "This right of water may be transferred
like other property.' '87
In Kidd v. Laird, s decided five years after Irwin v. Phillips, the
court's uncertainty continued over the exact category of property
interests held by an appropriator. Nevertheless, the court was clear
that property interests were created by appropriation:
This Court has never departed from the doctrine that running
water, so long as it continues to flow in its natural course, is not,
and cannot be made the subject of private ownership. A right may
be acquired to its use, which will be regarded and protected as
property; but it has been distinctly declared in several cases that
this right carries with it no specific property in the water itself. We
are not called upon to determine the character of the property
which the owner of the ditch has in the water actually diverted by
and flowing in his ditch. With reference to such water, his power
of control and right of enjoyment are exclusive and absolute, and
it is a matter of little practical importance whether, in the strict
legal sense, it be or be not private property. 9
83. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).
84. Id.
85. 13 Cal. 220 (1859).
86. Id. at 232.
87. Id.at 233.
88. 15 Cal. 161 (1860).
89. Id. at 179-80 (emphasis added). The argument over the character of the interest in
appropriated water echoes similar debates in both the civil and common law. See WATER
RiGHTs IN T WsTE=RN STATEs, supra note 22, 690, at 755-58. Once withdrawn, appropriated,
or severed, "the particles of water that have passed into private control in a reservoir, ditch
or other passed artificial structure or appliance ... have been taken from their natural haunts,
so to speak, and passed into private possession and control, and become private property."
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The court then approved a jury instruction authorizing a defendant
to change the place of diversion so long as others were not harmed.
The court rejected plaintiff's assertion that such an instruction im-
plied private ownership of the water itself, rather than an interest in
the water's use.90
Despite the halting language in these early cases, the outline of
the property interests in an appropriative right had emerged. Like a
riparian right, an appropriative right was usufructuary, and did not
include ownership of the water while flowing. The appropriative right
holder was entitled to judicial relief against a subsequent diverter
upon a showing of harm. The holder could convey the right. By
1863, only eight years after Irwin v. Phillips, the court had begun
to describe appropriative rights as "vested right[s] of property." 91
By 1912, the courts had settled the primary incidents of ownership
of an appropriative right. In Thayer v. California Development Co.,92
the court summarized:
Under the law of this state as established at the beginning, the
water-right which a person gains by diversion from a stream for a
beneficial use is a private right, a right subject to ownership and
disposition by him, as in the case of other private property. All the
decisions recognize it as such. Many of them refer to it in terms
Id. at 756 (footnote omitted) (analogizing to capture of wild animals).
It remains only to be said that this private property in the corpus of the water
severed from the stream is based entirely on possession and control of the particles,
and ceases when the possession and control cease. It is lost by escape of the water
or its abandonment; whereupon the particles again cease to be his property; and are
again nobody's property.
Id. at 757 (emphasis in original, footnote omitted).
In California, the corpus of waters appropriated is considered private property during the
period of their use. See, e.g., Lindblom v. Round Valley Water Co., 178 Cal. 450, 455-56,
173, P. 994, 996-97 (1918) (corpus "perhaps" owned when reduced to possession in a reservoir);
Parks Canal & Mining Co. v. Hoyt, 57 Cal. 44, 46 (1880); W. HtrrcmNs, supra note 22, at
38-40.
90. Kidd, 15 Cal. at 179-82.
91. Rupley v. Welch, 23 Cal. 452, 455 (1863).
Professor Lauer argues that "the term 'vested' is used solely as a make-weight." RIPARIAN
RIGHTS AS PROPERTY, supra note 12, at 141. He further notes, "'It is incorrect to say that the
judiciary protected property; rather they called that property to which they accorded protec-
tion."' Id. at 142 (quoting Property, 12 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 528, 536
(1934)).
Although the appellation "vested" may not add much analytically to determining whether
some unlabeled item deserves constitutional protection, the courts' use of the term certainly
signals their attitude towards the necessity of protecting any item so labeled. See RIPAIAN
RIGHTS As PROPERTY, supra note 12, at 141. Thus, within eight years of judicial recognition
of appropriative rights, the California courts were indicating that such rights deserved consti-
tutional protection.
92. 164 Cal. 117, 128 P. 21 (1912).
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which can have no other meaning than that the right is private
property.93
The second major period of development of California water law
climaxed in Lux v. Haggin94 with the formal confirmation of Cali-
fornia's adoption of riparian rights. By the time of Lux v. Haggin,
the development climate in California had changed dramatically.
Whereas early California development occurred largely on public
domain land by miners, the California economy had greatly changed
by 1886. Much land had passed out of the public domain and into
private hands. Moreover, the character and relative importance of
the mining industry to the state's overall economy had changed.
Indeed, just prior to Lux v. Haggin, the courts had effectively ended
hydraulic mining with their decision in People v. Gold Run Ditch &
Mining Co. 95
As mining waned, irrigated agriculture waxed in the second half
of the 19th century. Water's value for irrigation in California's arid
climate soon became apparent. 96 Owners of land adjoining waters
were in a position to use such waters on riparian lands. At the same
time, ranchers attempted to construct irrigation works to transport
waters to non-riparian lands. 97 Inevitable conflict arose between the
appropriators and the riparian owners. The clash came to a head in
Lux v. Haggin.
As early as 1865, the court had decided a water dispute between
riparian proprietors solely upon common law riparian rules. 9 Over
the next twenty years, the court decided another nine cases upon
riparian principles.9 Indeed, in an 1882 decision, St. Helena Water
Co. v. Forbes,1'0 the court discussed the nature of the riparian owner's
property interest as "part and parcel of the land."''1
In Lux v. Haggin, the court reaffirmed that California had indeed
adopted riparian rights with passage in 1850 of a statute enacting
93. Id. at 125, 128 P. at 24 (emphasis added).
94. 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
95. 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884). In Gold Run, the California Supreme Court upheld
an injunction against hydraulic mining on the theory that the prodigious debris resulting from
such operations impaired navigability and constituted a public nuisance. Id. at 152, 4 P. at
1159-60.
96. Shaw, supra note 63, at 452-53, 189 Cal. at 789.
97. Id. at 789-90.
98. Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 340, 343-45 (1865).
99. See cases collected in W. Hu-rcmNs, supra note 22, at 53 n.7.
100. 62 Cal. 182 (1882).
101. Id. at 184.
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England's common law as California's law.102 The case involved a
dispute between a downstream riparian rancher and an upstream
diverter. The upstream diversion reduced the flow available to the
plaintiff downstream. In its famous, exhaustive opinion, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court upheld riparian rights against every conceivable
argument.
Lux v. Haggin has been discussed at length in legal literature. 0 3
Several of its points are also germane to the purposes of this Article.
Of particular importance is the court's rejection of "public policy,"'' 4
and utilitarian gains 05 as grounds for abrogating riparian rights. The
court stated:
But the policy of the state is not created by the judicial department,
although the judicial department may be called upon at times to
declare it .... But if [an appropriator] shall consume the water
himself, one may thus, for his own benefit, arbitrarily deprive many
of an advantage, which, whether technically private property or
not, is of great value, and thus secure to himself that which, by
every definition, is a species of private property in him.... If, in
accordance with the law, such lands may be deprived of the natural
irrigation without compensation to the owners, we must so hold;
but we fail to discover the principles of "public policy" which are
of themselves a paramount authority and demand that the law shall
be so declared. In our opinion, it does not require prophetic vision
to anticipate that the adoption of the rule, so called, of "appro-
priation" would result in time of a monopoly of all the waters of
the state by comparatively few individuals, or combination of
individuals controlling aggregated capital, who could either apply
the water to purposes useful to themselves, or sell it to those from
whom they had taken it away, as well as to others.... Whatever
the rule laid down, a monopoly or concentration of the waters in
a few hands may occur in the future. But surely it is not requiring
too much to demand that the owners of land shall be compensated
for the natural advantages of which they are to be deprived.'06
Elsewhere, the court stated: "The right to the use of the waters as
part of the land once vested in its private grantee, the state has no
102. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 79, 87, 390-94, 10 P. 674, 746-51, 753-55 (1886).
103. See, e.g., WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 135-37; W.
HuTcmNs, supra note 22, at 52-55, 235-36; Shaw, supra note 63, at 455-56, 189 Cal. at 791-92;
Anderson, supra note 22, 189 Cal. at 17-19.
104. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. at 299-313, 10 P. at 697-705.
105. Id. at 307-08, 10 P. at 701-02.
106. Id. at 307-10, 10 P. at 702-03 (emphasis in original).
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power to divest him of the right, except upon due compensation."'' 07
Lux v. Haggin thus refused to divest riparian owners of their
common law rights by mere appeal to public policy or perceived
social gains. The court insisted that any divestment of such rights
for public uses could come only upon payment of just compensation.
As Justice Shaw later described:
The obvious answer on the question of policy is that the objection
comes too late, that it should have been made to the legislature in
1850, prior to the enactment of the statute adopting the common
law. When that was done, the riparian rights became vested and
thereupon the much more important public policy of protecting the
right of private property, became paramount and controlling. This
policy is declared in our constitutions, has been adhered to through-
out our national history, and it is through it that the remarkable
progress and development of the country has been made possible.)"8
In the forty years following Lux v. Haggin, the court took numerous
opportunities to expound upon the riparian right's constitutional
sanctity. For example, in Southern California Investment Company
v. Wilshire,109 the court noted:
As [a] riparian owner, [plaintiff] has the right to have the stream
continue to flow through its lands in the accustomed manner, and
to use the same to irrigate an additional area thereof, undiminished
by any additional or more injurious use or diversion of the water
upon the stream above. This right is a part of the estate of the
plaintiff-parcel in its land,-and whether it is or is not as valuable
in a monetary point of view, or as beneficial to the community in
general, as would be the use of a like quantity of water in some
other place, it cannot be taken by the defendants without right, or,
in case of a public use elsewhere, without compensation." 0
2. 'Clash Between Competing Theories: Herminghaus v. Southern
California Edison Company and Fall River Valley Irrigation
District v. Mt. Shasta Power Corporation
107. Id. at 374-75, 10 P. at 743.
108. Shaw, supra note 63, at 456, 189 Cal. at 792.
109. 144 Cal. 68, 77 P. 767 (1904).
110. Id. at 73, 77 P. 770. In San Bernardino v. City of Riverside, 186 Cal. 7, 198 P. 784
(1921) the court stated:
The original rights to the waters of the streams in this state are those which by the
common law were vested in the owners of the land abutting upon the stream, under
the doctrine of riparian rights, as it is commonly termed. [citations omitted] Such
rights are attached to the land as parcel thereof, and, of course, are private property.
Id. at 13, 198 P. at 709. See also Antioch v. Williams Irrigation Dist., 188 Cal. 451, 462-63,
205 P. 688, 693-94 (1922).
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a. Herminghaus Majority Opinion
The pinnacle of express judicial protection of vested rights in
California water is Herminghaus v. Southern California Edison Com-
pany."' Herminghaus involved a clash between downstream riparian
ranchers and an upstream power company appropriator. The ranchers
depended upon the annual peak flow of the unregulated San Joaquin
River to overflow and inundate their lands and foster grass produc-
tion." 2 The power company sought to construct a large reservoir
upstream from plaintiff's ranch. This dam would have regulated the
variable river flows to plaintiffs' harm.
The power company challenged the reasonableness of the ranchers'
large flow requirements for natural pasture irrigation. It claimed that
the volume of water necessary to raise the San Joaquin River's level
above its banks to inundate plaintiffs' lands wasted huge amounts
of water. The power company argued that the actual quantum of
water required on plaintiffs' field could be supplied without such
waste through construction of irrigation works. 3
The Herminghaus court reviewed the relationship between the
power company's appropriative rights and the ranchers' riparian
rights. While the court found a reasonable use rule between two
riparian right holders, it found no such reasonableness limitation
between a riparian and an appropriator.14 Instead, the court reaf-
firmed the riparian's priority over appropriators." 5
In an extensive quote from Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal &
Irrigation Co.,"6 the Herminghaus court rejected an attempt to
reallocate water from an "inefficient" riparian to a more efficient
appropriator even though greater net social benefits might flow from
the appropriator's use. The court stated:
It may be that, if nonriparian owners are permitted to intercept the
winter flow of streams, in order to irrigate nonriparian lands, or
to develop power, the water so taken will permit the cultivation of
more land and benefit a greater number of people than will be
served if the flow continues in its accustomed course ... Neither
111. 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 607 (1926).
112. Id. at 86-87, 93-94, 252 P. at 609, 612.
113. Id. at 105-08, 252 P. at 617-18.
114. Id. at 99-102, 252 P. at 614-15, (quoting Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation
Co., 155 Cal. 59, 63-65, 99 P. 502, 511-12 (1909)).
115. Id. at 94-98, 252 P. at 612-13, (citing Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886),
and quoting at length from Southern Cal. Inv. Co. v. Wilshire, 144 Cal. 68, 73, 77 P. 767,
769 (1904)).
116. Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 155 Cal. 59, 99 P. 502 (1909).
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a court nor the legislature, however, has the power to say that
because such water may be more beneficially used by others it may
be freely taken by them. Public policy is at best a vague and
uncertain guide, and no consideration of policy can justify the
taking of private property without compensation. If the higher
interests of the public should be thought to require that the water
usually flowing in streams of this state should be subject to appro-
priation in ways that will deprive the riparian proprietor of its
benefit, the change sought must be accomplished by the use of the
power of eminent domain."
7
Applying general riparian law to the plaintiffs' lands, the court
initially left room for limiting its ruling to the case's peculiar topog-
raphy." 8 Nevertheless, it quickly dispelled any notions that it intended
its ruling to be limited to similar topography." 9 The court refused
to order plaintiffs to put their property to a high economic use.2 0
The court also rejected forced conservation at the plaintiffs' ex-
117. Herminghaus, 200 Cal. at 101, 251 P. at 615.
The argument that these waters are of great value for the purposes of storage by
appropriators and of small value to the lower riparian owners defeats itself. If the
right sought to be taken be of small worth, the burden of paying for it will not be
great. If, on the other hand, great benefits are conferred upon the riparian lands
by the flow, there is all the more reason why these advantages should not, without
compensation, be taken from the owner of these lands and transferred to others.
Id. at 102, 251 P. at 615, ( quotinq 155 Cal. at 65, 99 P. 502, 505 (1909)).
118. The Supreme Court noted:
[T]hat apart from certain general similarities of location, topography, adaptability,
and quality, the plaintiffs' tract of land as to its position, adaptability, and soil
qualities, when taken in its relation to the San Joaquin River and the foresaid
natural distribution of the waters thereof, is peculiar, and in fact unique. From the
evidence in the case as reflected by the finding of the trial court it would seem to
be a tract of land especially designed and equipped by nature for pastoral uses....
Id. at 105, 252 P. at 617.
119. [E]ven if [plaintiffs' land] were not thus peculiarly adaptable to the irrigation
and growth of wild grasses for the pasture of stock, even if it were equally or even
more advantageously susceptible of adaption to more intensive and even more
profitable agricultural, horticultural, or viticultural uses, we are unable to perceive
under what showing or claim of right any other land owner along said river, or any
would-be appropriator of waters thereof, or any aggregation of individuals, or anly
court or even the state itself, would have the right to dictate to these plaintiffs,
choosing to devote their said lands and the water which, in its ordinary and usual
flow, as an integral part and parcel thereof, to its present beneficial uses, that they
should devote their said lands and the water flowing thereon to other and more
intensive uses which such individuals or such aggregation or such court or such state
might deem to be more in keeping, and, so to speak, more up to date with modern
development in the productive uses of property. To admit the right to such inter-
ference to the extent of taking away from the individual his initiative in deciding to
which of several adaptable uses he shall devote his property would be to divest him
to that extent of his most precious right of ownership therein.
Id. at 105, 252 P. at 617 (emphasis added).
120. Id.
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pense for the benefits of upper riparian or appropriators. 2' The court
considered that such forced "expensive improvements"'12 "would
... impose a radical and, in its outworking, an utterly impracticable
limitation upon the doctrine of riparian rights."'12 The court thus
rejected an implicit attempt to restrict plaintiffs' riparian rights to
that portion of the river which flowed over the banks and actually
entered upon plaintiff's soil. 24 Rather, the court held that plaintiffs
beneficially used the river's entire underflow, i.e., that portion of
flow that lifted up the water actually deposited for irrigation. 1 5 In
essence the court ruled that the plaintiffs' natural irrigation methods
were indeed reasonable and beneficial. 2
In addition to a sweeping affirmation of vested rights, the court
discounted attempts at legislative redefinition of riparian rights under
the guise of the police power. In particular, the court focused on
the legislature's attempt to limit riparian irrigation by defining the
amount of water that could be applied for specific "useful or
beneficial purposes."' 27 In reviewing a claimed police power basis
121. The fact that these plaintiffs might by artificial contrivances through dams and
ditches and reservoirs, involving large expenditures of money, so interrupt or so
regulate the present natural flow of said river as to render a smaller quantum of its
water sufficient to satisfy the beneficial uses which they are now making of such
waters in their entirety, could not possibly operate to limit or lessen their riparian
right to the usufruct of said waters in their natural course and under plaintiffs'
unique relation thereto.
Id. at 106, 252 P. at 617 (emphasis added).
122. Id. Thus, the court rejected a physical solution at the riparians' expense. See infra
notes 152-63, 216-30 and accompanying text.
123. Id. at 106-07, 252 P. 617.
124. Id. at 107, 252 P. 617.
125. Id.
126. Id. See Wiel, The Pending Water Amendment to the California Constitution and
Possible Legislation, 16 CALrn. L. Rav. 169, 175-76 n.10, 187-88 (1928) [hereinafter The
Pending Water Amendment].
127. In 1913, the California Legislature adopted the Water Commission Act ("Act"). 1913
Cal. Stat. Ch. 586 at 1012. Section 11 of that Act stated in part:
[A]II waters flowing in any river, stream, canyon, ravine, or other natural channel,
excepting so far as such waters have been or are being applied to useful and
beneficial purpose upon, or in so far as such waters are or may be reasonably
needed for useful, and beneficial purposes upon lands riparian thereto, or otherwise
appropriated, is and are hereby declared to be public waters of the State of California
and subject to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this act. If any
portion of the waters of any stream shall not be put to a useful or beneficial purpose
to or upon lands riparian to such stream for any continuous period of ten consecutive
years after the passage of this act, such non-application shall be deemed to be
conclusive presumption that the use of such portions of the waters of such stream
is not needed upon said riparian lands for any useful or beneficial purpose; and
such portion of the waters of any stream so non-applied, unless otherwise appro-
priated for a useful and beneficial purpose is hereby declared to be in the use of
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for legislative delineation of "useful or beneficial purposes," the
court raised three principal objections.
First, it noted that the plaintiffs' uses neither created a nuisance
nor contravened public welfare. 1' Thus, the traditional bases for
police power regulation were absent. Second, the court found a
judicial, case by case definition of "useful and beneficial purpose"
more appropriate than an absolute legislative rule: "To concede this
would be to concede to the legislative department of the state
government the arbitrary power to destroy vested rights in private
property of every kind and character.' '1 29  Third, the court rejected
the proffered police power arguments as inappropriate where the
State of California was not itself actively attempting to adjust the
private rights under a comprehensive scheme to optionally develop
state waters.130 The court left open the possibility that under cir-
cumstances of comprehensive state action, "a most liberal interpreta-
tion of the police powers of the state might rightfully be invoked
in support of such an effort."' 3'
b. Herminghaus Dissenting Opinion
The tensions between judicial protection of vested rights and
governmental allocation of water are prevalent within Herminghaus
itself. Although the majority opinion vigorously upheld the propriety
of judicial protection of vested rights, the dissent objected strenu-
ously. The debate between the majority and dissenting opinions has
kindled much of the development in California water law over the
past sixty years.
In his dissent, Justice Shenk argued that plaintiff's use of ninety-
nine percent of the San Joaquin River's flow to provide lift for a
mere one percent used for direct irrigation was unreasonable as a
the state and subject to appropriation in accordance with the provisions of this act.
1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 11, at 1018 (emphasis added).
Section 42 of that Act defined "useful or beneficial purposes":
[t]he term 'useful or beneficial purposes' as used in this act shall not be construed
to mean the use in any one year of more than two and one-half acre feet of water
per acre in the irrigation of uncultivated areas of land not devoted to cultivated
crops.
1913 Cal. Stat. ch. 586, sec. 42, at 1033.
128. 200 Cal. at 117, 252 P. at 622.
129. Id. at 118, 252 P. at 622.
130. Id. at 120, 252 P. at 623.
131. Id.
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matter of law. 32 He discussed the legislature's power to define
common law riparian rights. Without authority, Justice Shenk as-
serted: "The legislature has the right in the first instance to prescribe
the standards of beneficial use and reasonable necessity that may be
applied to the use of water." 133 He noted that courts in other states
had limited riparian rights. 34 He argued that the riparian rights'
common law basis carried with it its own repealer. 135 He stated that
plaintiffs had never obtained a vested right to waste water. 36
In addition, the dissent addressed the particular remedy sought.
Even after conceding that plaintiffs rightfully used the overflow for
irrigation lift, Justice Shenk argued that the injunction granted by
the trial court and upheld by the majority was inappropriate. 137 He
wished to limit the plaintiffs to damages. Damages would be meas-
ured by the cost of irrigation facilities 138 sufficient to provide plaintiffs
with the amount of water actually required on the field for irrigation.
c. Fall River Valley Irrigation District v. Mt. Shasta Power
Corporation
Eight months after announcing its decision in Herminghaus, the
Supreme Court reiterated the vested nature of riparian rights for
perhaps the last meaningful time. In Fall River Valley Irrigation
District v. Mount Shasta Power Corp.,' 39 the court considered the
inverse of the Herminghaus facts. In Herminghaus, an upstream
appropriator sought to use water for hydropower purposes over the
objections of downstream riparian irrigators. In Fall River Valley
132. Id. at 123, 129, 252 P. 624, 627.
133. Id. at 125, 252 P. 624.
134. Id. (citing In re Water Rights of Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (1924),
and Brown v. Chase, 125 Wash. 542, 217 P. 23 (1923)).
135. 200 Cal. at 125-26, 252 P. at 625.
One of the characteristics of the common law is that it contains within itself its own
repealer, that is to say, it changes as conditions change and adapts itself to new
conditions, ex proprio vigore .... [t]he conditions prevailing over 40 years ago
when [Lux v. Haggin] was decided were far different from conditions existing at
the present time when the growth and prosperity of the state are so dependent on
the proper conservation of the excess waters of its rivers by storage for irrigation
and power uses. [T]he common law, by its own principle, adapts itself to varying
conditions and mo'difies its rules so as to subserve the ends of present requirements.
Id. (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 126, 252 P. 626, (citing Eden Irrigation Co. v. District Court, 61 Utah 103,
211 P. 957 (1922)).
137. 200 Cal. at 129-30, 252 P. 627.
138. Id. Justice Shenk's dissent does not address the ability of his physical solution to
protect the plaintiffs' unexercised rights to future beneficial uses.
139. 202 Cal. 56, 259 P. 444 (1927).
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I.D., a downstream riparian hydropower project fought the upstream
diversion of water for irrigation.14 Plaintiff appropriators had filed
their briefs prior to the court's decision in Herminghaus. They argued
that the court should "defin[e] the riparian right to be a mere rule
of property and not a vested estate.' ' 41 Relying upon Herminghaus,
however, the court soundly rejected plaintiff's argument: "at no time
has there been any uncertainty as to the ingredients, quality, or
strength of the right .... In [Herminghaus], we reexamined the
question and pronounced the riparian right a vested one.' ' 42
B. The Reasonableness Doctrine Prior to the 1928 Amendment
As will be discussed below, courts have seized upon the 1928
constitutional amendment's "reasonableness" provision to justify
140. Id. at 58, 259 P. at 445. The riparian's right to store water for hydropower came by
virtue of its condemnation of all competing riparian claims between its point of diversion and
its power house. Id. at 71-73, 259 P. at 451.
141. Id. at 63, 259 P. at 447 (emphasis added).
142. Id. at 63-64, 259 P. at 447. The court noted how Fall River differed from Herminghaus.
Id. at 64, 259 P. 447-48. The case did not involve questions of underftow, overflow, or
"greedy or selfish" riparian owners seeking "the entire hydraulic effect of the stream to
'boost' to its own lands the small amount of water required for irrigation or domestic
purposes." Id., 259 P. at 448. Indeed, even Justice Shenk, author of the dissent in Hermin-
ghaus, agreed with the majority that the power company "has upon its own riparian land put
the whole of said stream to a recognized beneficial use." Id. at 64, 73, 259 P. at 448, 451
(Shenk, J., concurring).
The court rejected plaintiff's attempt to quantify the natural flow of Fall PRiver:
To curtail the [riparian] right by a fixation of rigid and inelastic boundaries is to
destroy the right altogether, for in such case it would become a mere right of
priority, or, in other words, it would be tantamount to the substitution of the
doctrine of appropriation for the doctrine of riparian rights.... We, therefore,
here, reassert the riparian right to be a vested property right inhering in and a part
and parcel of the abutting lands .... This right to use the water of the stream we
hold to be entitled to the same respect and protection at the hands of the law as
any other vested property right.
Id. at 65, 259 P. at 448.
The court also attempted to limit Herminghaus' discussion about the Water Commission
Act's impact on riparian rights. Id. at 66-69, 259 P. at 448-50. The court distinguished between
legislative powers to redefine rights and requirements for due process and just compensation:
No question can arise as to the power of the legislature to modify or abrogate a
rule of the common law. The question is: Can any such change affect the previously
vested rights of property owners? We need here only say that the legislative
department of the state may not take any portion of a vested property right from
one person and invest another with it and be justified in so doing in view of the
[due process and takings clauses in the state and federal constitutions].
Id. at 67, 259 P. at 449 (emphasis added). The court again acknowledged that "proper
circumstances" might exist under which riparian rights could "yield to the police power in the
interest of public health, safety, comfort, or welfare .... " Id. at 68, 259 P. at 449. Never-
theless, the court found that the Water Commission Act did not purport to exercise such
police power; moreover, had it so purported, it could not apply to a situation such as Fall
River where no surplus water existed for subsequent appropriation. Id. at 68-69, 259 P. at
449-50.
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divestment of previously protected property interests in water without
payment of compensation. The reasonableness doctrine, however,
was not itself a product of the 1928 amendment. Rather, as Justice
Shenk in his Herminghaus dissent noted, California courts had
already imposed a reasonable use limitation upon many classes of
water users. 143 Thus, this reasonableness doctrine did not arise sua
sponte after the 1928 amendment; rather, it arose out of a back-
ground of judicial interpretation of the term's meaning. In particular,
courts had already interpreted the reasonableness doctrine in discus-
sions of duties to conserve water, to prevent waste, and to pay for
physical solutions that enlarged the surplus of water available for
use by subsequent appropriators.
As described above, the reasonableness doctrine first arose in
riparian theory under Justice Story's decision in Tyler v. Wilkinson.
Early decisions ascribed various meanings to "reasonable" riparian
use, ranging from natural flow to correlative shares. In California,
courts quickly rejected the natural flow theory in favor of correlative
rights of all riparians to a proportionate share of flow.'" In Harris
v. Harrison,15 the court described some of the factors that determine
the reasonableness of one riparian's use:
The length of the stream, the volume of water in it, the extent of
each ownership along the banks, the character of the soil owned
by each contestant, the area sought to be irrigated by each, - all
these, and many other considerations, must enter into the solution
of the problem; but one principle is surely established, namely, that
no proprietor can absorb all the water of the stream so as to allow
none to flow down to its neighbor.'"
The courts also applied a reasonableness doctrine in disputes
between appropriators. For example, in Phoenix Water Co. v.
Fletcher,47 a downstream prior appropriator challenged the timing
and quality of flows released from a subsequent appropriator's
upstream dam. The court noted:
143. 200 Cal. 81, 124, 252 P. 607, 625 (1926).
144. See, e.g., Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 408, 10 P. 674, 763 (1886).
The reasonable usefulness of a quantity of water for irrigation is always relative; it
does not depend on the convenience of or profitable results to the particular
proprietor, but upon the reasonable use, reference being had to the needs of all the
other proprietors on the stream. It depends, in other words, on all the circumstances.
Id.
145. 93 Cal. 676, 29 P. 325 (1892).
146. Id. at 681, 29 P. at 326-27. See also Gould v. Stafford, 91 Cal. 146, 152, 27 P. 543,
544-45 (1891).
147. 23 Cal. 482 (1863).
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The rule of law is well established, that the owner of hydraulic
works on the stream above, has no right to detain the water
unreasonably. It is said that the proprietors above have a right to
a reasonable use of the water; but the true test of this is, whether
such use causes any positive or sensible injury to the prior appro-
priator or proprietor below, by diminishing the value of the right.'48
In Hill v. Smith,14 9 another early case, the court applied the maxim
"sic utere tuo et alienum nom laedas"'' 50 to competing appropriators.
In other cases, the courts clarified that an appropriator's right only
extended to the waters reasonably necessary for the purposes for
which the diversion was made. 5 1 Thus, pre-1928 case law had sketched
the contours of the reasonableness doctrine during the same period
that the courts were most concerned with protection of vested prop-
erty rights.
A number of pre-1928 reasonableness cases involved duties to use
water efficiently and prevent waste. 52 The courts held that the duty
to conserve water and prevent waste required only reasonable water
use efficiency. For example, in Barrows v. Fox,153 the court considered
a dispute between an upstream appropriator and downstream ripar-
ians. The plaintiffs appropriated water from a diversion dam into
an unlined ditch. The riparian defendants sought to limit the plain-
tiffs' appropriative rights to that quantity which actually reached
plaintiffs' non-riparian lands after conveyance losses. 54 Although
substituton of iron pipe for plaintiffs' ditch would have reduced
conveyance losses, thereby freeing surplus for defendant riparians'
use, the court refused to force plaintiff appropriators to endure such
expense. 5 Rather, the court implicitly distinguished unnecessary waste
from reasonable conveyance losses. 5 6 It determined reasonableness
148. Id. at 486.
149. Hill v. Smith, 27 Cal. 476, 482-83 (1865).
150. "So use your own property as not to injure that of another." BALLENTINE's LAW
DICTIONARY 1178 (3d ed. 1969).
151. See, e.g., California Pastoral & Agric. Co. v. Madera Canal & Irrigation Co., 167
Cal. 78, 84, 138 P. 718, 721 (1914).
152. See, e.g., Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 276 P. 1017 (1929); Barrows
v. Fox, 98 Cal. 63, 32 P. 811 (1893); Natoma Water & Mining Co. v. Hancock, 101 Cal. 42,
31 P. 112 (1894).
153. 98 Cal. 63, 32 P. 811 (1893).
154. Id. at 66, 32 P. at 812.
155. Ditches and flumes are the usual and ordinary means of diverting water in this
state, and parties who have made their appropriations by such means cannot be
compelled to substitute iron pipes, though they may be compelled to keep their
flumes and ditches in good repair so as to prevent any unnecessary waste.
Id. at 67, 32 P. at 812.
156. Id.
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by reference to local custom. It recognized a duty to maintain a
system at its designed efficiency level. But, the court refused to
compel the senior rights holder to pay for the cost of a physical
solution that freed additional waters for other users.
Other cases repeat this theme. For example, in Natoma Water &
Mining Co. v. Hancock,157 an appropriator had constructed a dam
to raise the streamflow into his diversion ditches. During low flow
periods, the appropriator temporarily raised the dam's height by
adding a "false crest of lumber, or riprap and gunnysacks." '15 S A
subsequent appropriator constructed his diversion facility in the slack-
water above plaintiff's dam. The defendant only sought to divert
waters surplus to plaintiff's needs. Appropriating that surplus, how-
ever, reduced the head available to raise the water behind plaintiff's
diversion dam for conveyance through plaintiff's ditch.1 59
The court found that the defendant's diversion of the surplus
created mere "inconvenience and trouble which was ... damnum
absque injuria.' 160 Where a prior appropriator can use reasonable
diligence and ordinary means of diversion to obtain all that he is
entitled to, no actionable injury results.16 1 Thus, the court required
the prior appropriator to raise the crest of his dam-as he did
otherwise during low flow periods-to make some surplus available
to the subsequent user.
Natoma and Barrows illustrate the alternatives presented by chal-
lenges to the reasonableness of water use. If the court found a
reasonable use in reference to local custom and efficiency, the court
would only order the senior rights holder to bear the cost of an
improvement in water use efficiency if that improvement is otherwise
an ordinary means of diversion, or a "usual and reasonable meas-
157. 101 Cal. 42, 35 P. 334 (1894).
158. Id. at 45, 35 P. at 335.
159. Id. at 50, 35 P. at 337.
160. Id. (emphasis in original).
161. Id. at 50-51, 35 P. at 336-37. The court elaborated:
While the right of the prior appropriator is carefully protected, he is compelled to
exercise it with due regard to the rights of others and the paramount interests of
the public. The quantity of his lawful appropriation cannot be diminished, but he
must return the surplus to the stream without unnecessary waste, and he must use
reasonable diligence and reasonably efficient appliances in making his diversion in
order that the surplus may not be rendered unavailable to those who are entitled to
it.... [A] prior appropriator whose means of diversion become insufficient for his
purposes, by reason of their inherent defects, when the surplus is diverted above
him, must take the usual and reasonable measures to perfect such means.
Id. at 51-52, 35 P. at 337.
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ure. 6 2 Perfect water use efficiency was not required. 63 Only if a
water use was unreasonably inefficient, or again, if mere minor
inconveniences resulted to the senior holder from changes in diversion
methods, did the court order the senior rights holder to improve
efficiency at its own expense.
V. CHANGES IN JuDIcIAL ATTITUDES TowARDs PROTECTION OF
PROPERTY RIGHTS SINCE 1928
By 1926, the year of the Herminghaus decision, California law
had firmly established that water rights were compensable property
interests and the courts had developed a comprehensive body of
precedent defining their scope and limitations. The remainder of this
article will focus on the redefinition of that property right which has
occurred since 1928. In the years since Herminghaus, the law, pri-
marily through court decisions, has extensively redefined the scope
of the property right in water. The changes can only be viewed as a
broad retreat from protection of private property aspects in favor of
utilitarian reallocations.
The first major redefinition was the 1928 adoption of article X,
section 2, to the California Constitution. While the amendment was
extremely important, its scope is often misstated. As described pre-
viously, it did not add the reasonableness doctrine to California law.
That doctrine had been evolving for more than fifty years prior to
the amendment's approval. Instead, the amendment incorporated the
doctrine, as it had been historically interpreted by the courts, into
the Constitution, and extended it to competition between riparians
and appropriators.
The cases decided during the first forty years after the amendment's
adoption did not further redefine the nature or extent of private
property rights in water. They did firmly establish that the amend-
162. Id. at 52, 35 P. at 337.
163. See, e.g., Joerger v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 207 Cal. 8, 23, 276 P. 1017, 1024.
While an appropriator can claim only the amount which is necessary to properly
supply his needs, and can permit no water to go to waste, he is not bound ... to
adopt the best method for utilizing the water or take extraordinary precautions to
prevent waste. He is entitled to make a reasonable use of the water according to
the custom of the locality and as long as he does so, other persons cannot complain
of his acts. The amount of water required to irrigate his lands should, therefore, be
determined by reference to the system used, although it may result in some wastes
which might be avoided by the adoption of another or more elaborate and extensive
distribution system.
Id. (citing Barrows v. Fox, 98 Cal. 63).
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ment had extended the reasonableness doctrine to riparians' disputes
with appropriators. But the cases did so in a way that interpreted
the riparians' reasonableness obligations in a manner consistent with
the pre-amendment precedent.
In four landmark decisions since 1967, however, the courts have
redefined the nature of the protectible property interest in water so
as to leave no water right, riparian or appropriative, privately or
publicly held, unscathed. Indeed, the courts are propelling California
into a new era of judicially and administratively supervised reallo-
cations of its water resources, on the premise that water use is more
a governmentally granted privilege than a privately held property
right.
Since 1928, the courts have primarily used two doctrines to redefine
the scope of the vested property right in water and thereby avoid
possible compensation requirements when curtailing water rights.
First, the courts have relied upon the state's police powers to redefine
all water rights and limit their future exercise. 64 Second, the courts
have greatly expanded the scope of the public trust doctrine.165 Under
this theory, courts hold that the state, when it granted water rights
to individuals, retained certain overriding ownership rights later as-
sertable to the detriment of riparian or appropriative water rights
holders. 66
A. Judicial Approval of Greatly Broadened Police Power as a
Basis For Reallocation of California Water Resources
1. The 1928 Constitutional Amendment
The constitutional amendment passed in 1928 is the fulcrum upon
which rests most judicial efforts to shift control of California waters
from private to public hands. On its face, the amendment passed by
the voters limited all rights in California water resources to beneficial
and reasonable uses. 67 The amendment's actual impact, however,
164. See infra notes 192-264 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 265-302 and accompanying text.
166. In addition to these two principal bases for state reallocation of resources without
payment of compensation, the possibility exists for the courts to further state control by
creation of new water rights. See, e.g., Note, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Source of State
Reserved Water Rights, 63 DEN. U.L. Rav. 585 (1986) (advocating recognition of state reserved
rights on the model of federal reserved rights) [hereinafter State Reserved Water Rights].
167. The 1928 Amendment added Article XIV, Section 3, to the California Constitution.
As enacted, Section 3 read:
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was more modest. As discussed earlier, for over fifty years prior to
the amendment's passage, California had recognized and enforced a
reasonable use limitation on both appropriative water users and on
riparians in disputes with other riparians. There is no evidence that
the amendment was offered or passed to change the scope or meaning
of that preexisting limitation. Rather, the amendment appears to be
a constitutional reaffirmation of existing law. The amendment broad-
ened the existing reasonableness doctrine to encompass conflicts
between riparians and appropriators, thereby reversing Herminghaus.
Prior to its enactment and initial interpretation by the Supreme
Court, 168 substantial uncertainty existed over the amendment's actual
meaning. Before the 1928 election, the Commonwealth Club of
California sponsored discussions concerning the amendment's possi-
ble meaning. 69 At least four separate interpretations were offered.
Mr. Charles Albert Adams argued that the amendment improperly
took riparian property without compensation. 70 Mr. A. Kempkey
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this State the
general welfare requires that the water resources of the State be put to beneficial
use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that the waste or unreasonable
use or unreasonable method of use of water be prevented, and that the conservation
of such waters is to be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use
thereof in the interest of the people and for the public welfare. The right to water
or to the use or flow of water in or from any natural stream or water course in
this State is and shall be limited to such water as shall be reasonably required for
the beneficial use to be served, and such right does not and shall not extend to the
waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use or unreasonable method
of diversion of water. Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to
no more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used consistently
with this section, for the purposes for which such lands are, or may be made
adaptable, in view of such reasonable and beneficial uses; provided, however, that
nothing herein contained shall be construed as depriving any riparian owner of the
reasonable use of water of the stream to which his land is riparian under reasonable
methods of diversion and use, or of depriving any appropriator of water to which
he is lawfully entitled. This section shall be self-executing, and the Legislature may
also enact laws in the furtherance of the policy in this section contained.
On November 5, 1974, two gender references in the section's third sentence were eliminated
with the substitution of "the owner's land" for "his land" and "the appropriator is lawfully
entitled" for "he is lawfully entitled." See CAL. CONST. CODE art. X §2 (Deering 1981). On
June 8, 1976, article XIV, section 3, was repealed and reenacted without change as article X,
section 2. For convenience, we refer to this section of the Constitution as "the 1928 Amend-
ment" or "article X, section 2."
168. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). See infra notes 199-
211 and accompanying text.
169. 23 Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California (No. 8), published in 4
THE COiMONwALmTH 329 (No. 37, Sept. 11, 1928).
170. Mr. Adams stated:
In California a riparian right is just as much a part and parcel of the land as is the
soil itself. There is no more justification for taking a part of the water than there
would be for taking a part of the land; and in the opinion of many, no more, and
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argued that the amendment merely declared state policy.17' Mr.
Kempkey further elaborated on prevention of waste and anticipated
the California Supreme Court's decision in Peabody v. City of
Vallejo. Commenting upon a proposed diversion to storage by a city,
he argued that the amendment would allow diversion of waters that
would otherwise run to waste in a bay.172 Justice John Preston argued
that the amendment was harmless if not intended to change riparian
law, but unconstitutional, under the federal constitution, if it did. 173
Finally, Mr. C. Grunsky argued that the proposed amendment ad-
dressed the "unfortunate definition"' 74 that riparian rights included
a right of potential future use. He argued that the amendment merely
sought to allow appropriation of surplus water that riparian owners
could not otherwise use beneficially. 75
perhaps not so much, reason .... We may concede that the so-called Colorado
theory best subserves the need of this day and age. It should have been perhaps
adopted as the law of this state; but it wasn't and under our law the riparian right
is a vested property right and part and parcel of the land itself. As I have said, if
a part of the water a man owns may be taken from him without compensation
because he is not putting it to beneficial use, so may a part of his land be taken.
There are those who approve of that sort of think [sic] (of course where it is not
their property that is taken.) I do not.
171. Mr. Kempkey stated:
The amendment speaks for itself. It is a declaration of policy. What you are asked
to vote upon is not taking somebody's riparian right or taking his water. The
amendment specifies particularly that, if possible, he shall have all the water that
he can use, either now or later on. I do not know that this amendment will
accomplish that. But such water as he cannot use will be subjected to beneficial use
otherwise. The amendment is purely a statement of policy, a statement that the
water in the streams shall be used to the greatest beneficial degree, and shall not be
claimed by a riparian owner to the exclusion of the use by everybody else.
Id. at 330-31.
172. Id. at 332. Mr. Kempkey further noted the relationship between the proposed amend-
ment and Herminghaus: "The Herminghaus case is probably the cause [of the amendment],
but whether this will get around the Herminghaus case is a matter for the future to determine."
Id.
173. Justice Preston stated:
If this amendment does not change the law so as to take private property for public
use without compensation, it is perfectly harmless; it is all right. And if it does take
private property without compensation, it is all right too for the Constitution of the
United States will step in and declare that this may not be done. So I do not think
that action by the electors on this amendment will cut very much of a figure; the
question will be as to the interpretation placed upon it should it be adopted.
Id. at 331. Justice Preston wrote the opinion in Fall River, 202 Cal. at 58. See supra notes
139-42 and accompanying text. In his first judicial opportunity to discuss the 1928 Amendment
after its passage, Justice Preston dissented without opinion in Gin S. Chow, 217 Cal. at 707.
He disqualified himself from Peabody because he had been one of the attorneys in the case
prior to his election to the Supreme Court. 2 Cal. 2d at 384.
174. The Commomwealth, supra 169, at 331.
175. Id. Mr. Grunsky stated:
It is not proposed to take away any property from anyone. If there is any method
1067
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
To a generation of attorneys raised under the Supreme Court's
definitive interpretation of article X, section 2, in Peabody v. City
of Vallejo, 76 this divergence of opinion on the amendment's purpose
and meaning is surprising. As discussed more fully below, Peabody
held that the 1928 Amendment was intended to overturn Hermin-
ghaus.177 Yet, prior to the 1928 Amendment's adoption, Samuel Wiel,
the foremost proponent of riparian interests in California at the time,
argued precisely the opposite. Wiel proclaimed that the pending
amendment constitutionalized Herminghaus and thus likely offered
greater protection to riparian rights!' 78
Wiel based his argument on several rules of statutory interpretation.
He began by reviewing the amendment's legislative history. The
amendment's promoters originally acted in response to the trial
court's ruling in Fall River. 79 During the pendency of the Fall River
appeal, the plaintiffs attempted to get the legislature to change
riparian rights. Before the legislature could consider the proposal,
the Herminghaus decision was issued.
Wiel examined Herminghaus and found two grounds for the de-
cision.
First and principally that section 11 of the Water Commission Act
[requires compensation for damages to riparian interests] since the
ranching was a useful and beneficial purpose and the natural flow
was reasonably needed for it. (Also-secondarily only, however,
that if the [Water Commission] Act purported to let the power
company impoverish the ranchers without compensation it would
be confiscatory and unconstitutional.)" °
Thus, in Wiel's view, the plaintiffs' use in Herminghaus had been
judicially determined to be a reasonable use of water for irrigation. 8'
by which this definition of the doctrine of riparian rights can be modified it would
be an advantage to this state to apply it. The pending measure is a mild attempt to
establish more firmly the principle that whatever surplus water the riparian rights
owner cannot use beneficially, shall be available for the use of someone else.
Id.
176. 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935). See infra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
177. See infra note 202 and accompanying text.
178. The Pending Water Amendment, supra note 126, at 176-77.
179. Id. at 171-73. The trial court's decision came out before the Supreme Court's
Herminghaus opinion. "The initial purpose was to read into the Constitution section 11 of
the Water Commission Act which enacted, in brief, that the protection [to riparians] should
apply only insofar as such waters are or may be reasonably needed for useful and beneficial
purposes upon lands riparian thereto." Id. at 171.
180. Id. at 172-73 (emphasis added).
181. Wiel quoted with approval that portion of Herminghaus where the trial court found
that the San Joaquin River overflow benefited the plaintiff's ranches. Id. at 173 n.6 (quoting
Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 104-5, 251 P. 607, 613). The Supreme
Court described these beneficial uses as "reasonable." 200 Cal. at 104.
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After Herminghaus, the movement to legislate limitations on ri-
parian rights took two prongs. The legislature appointed a joint
committee to meet With legal representatives from the major con-
cerned public service corporations.8 2 These lobbyists proposed two
separate amendments. The first amendment would have constitution-
alized the Water Commission Act's definition of reasonable use and
"oust[ed] the common law protection of [riparian interests] retro-
actively to the year 1850."183 The second proposal sought to "recon-
stitute the Water Commission, possibly with the view of bringing it
under control of the public service corporations." 1 4 The final version
of the proposed amendment, however only incorporated the "rea-
sonable and beneficial use" provisions of the Water Commission Act
into the Constitution.1 85
182. The Pending Water Amendment, supra note 126, at 173-174.
183. Id. at 174. See Senate Journal, 47th Session, 444, 450 (Mar. 4, 1927). This proposal
stated in part:
Riparian rights in a stream or watercourse attach to no more than so much of the
flow thereof, as may be required or used consistently [for reasonable and beneficial
purposes]. The flow of a stream or watercourse is that flow which is confined within
the natural banks thereof. The definition of riparian rights made in this article is to
be observed in the future, and is intended also as a statement of the law as the
same has existed continuously since by act of the Legislature of California the
common law of England was declared to be the rule of decision in all the courts of
this State.
Id. The proponents stated:
The purpose of this section is to define beyond the peradventure of a doubt the
limits of a riparian right in a stream or watercourse, and, further, to put beyond
the sphere of debate what it is that constitutes the flow of a stream or watercourse,
and that such water as has escaped beyond the natural banks of a stream is not a
part of the flow to which riparian rights attach. This section also makes it imperative
that the definition of water rights and of flow of stream be made the rule of
decisions in the State of California.
Id.
184. The Pending Water Amendment, supra note 126, at 174.
185. Id. at 175. viel described the legislative machinations between the initial proposals
and the final versions:
Publication of these drafts drew remonstrances to Governor Young. When the Joint
Committee reported to the legislature its report was in favor of the Water Commission
reconstitution, but it was against the dispossession measure as confiscatory. The
original measure and the Joint Committee were then abandoned by the proponents,
and the proposals were re-introduced as new measures in the two branches of the
legislature separately. In the discussions which this opened, the measure to reconsti-
tute the Water Commission, which adherence to the Joint Committee would have
obtained, was decisively defeated on the Senate floor. The other, affecting the
common law right of [riparians] to compensation, went through successive alterations.
The two new committees examining it were the Assembly and Senate Committees
on Constitutional Amendments. These, like the Joint Committee before (making
three committees that it went through in all), would not approve it. Presented in
both houses without committee approval, it was found necessary to relinquish the
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After reviewing the proposed amendment's legislative history, Wiel
gave his opinion of its likely effect. He noted that both Herminghaus
and Fall River had already interpreted the meaning of "reasonable
and beneficial use" as used within the Water Commission Act. 8 6
According to Wiel:
The Herminghaus and Fall River cases have passed upon [these
words] as leaving compensation to [riparians] unimpaired, with the
Supreme Court of the United States saying that it cannot interfere; 1 7
and the courts have often said that a substantial difference must
appear in a re-enactment before it can give rise to re-interpretation.
The words introduced to make a difference were, however, excluded
by the legislature.
By the "familiar rule," therefore, whether the Heringhaus [sic]
interpretation of the same wording be right or wrong, it would
seem that it will, as an adjudged matter not debatable again, pass
into the Constitution and be part of it. The legal effect of the
legislature's unwillingness to include the proposals that would have
effected a change, will probably be to put the Herminghaus ruling
into the Constitution attached to the re-enacted words. 8 '
As emphatically as Wiel, but with opposite opinions, the authors
of the ballot argument in favor of the proposed amendment urged
the voters to overturn Herminghaus. The authors, two assemblymen,
focused their arguments on the elimination of waste.18 9 No argument
features which would have made it do more than repeat the Water Commission
Act's provision of "reasonable use." In this form it passed in the final days of the
session. It came out declaring "reasonable use" to be the universal test for natural
water resources, controlling not alone riparians but everyone.
Id. at 174-75 (footnotes omitted).
186. Id. at 176.
187. The United States Supreme Court dismissed a writ of certiorari. Southern Cal. Edison
Co. v. Herminghaus, 275 U.S. 486 (1927).
188. The Pending Water Amendment, supra note 126, at 176-77 (emphasis added, footnotes
omitted).
189. Argument in Favor of Assembly Constitutional Amendment No. 27 (November 6,
1928).
[The amendment's] purpose is to prevent the waste of the waters of the state resulting
from an interpretation of our law which permits them to flow unused, unrestrained
and undiminished to the sea.
The legislature, not realizing the future needs of California, in 1850 adopted the
common law rule of England and in 1866 the Supreme Court of the state in the
case of Lux v. Haggin, declared that the legislature had by such act adopted the
English doctrine of riparian rights.
This doctrine provided that the owner of land bordering on a stream could insist
upon all of the waters of that stream being allowed to flow undiminished past his
land.
.... [The amendment] will change the present theory of the law that now permits
the unused, unrestrained and undiminished flow of our streams to the sea to be
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was submitted in opposition to the proposed amendment. On No-
vember 6, 1928, the amendment passed overwhelmingly. 190
2. The Method of Use and Physical Solution Cases
Samuel Wiel's prediction as to the amendment's likely interpreta-
tion was as far from reality as possible. The California Supreme
Court quickly moved to dispel any doubt that Herminghaus was no
longer California law.' 9'
The earliest California Supreme Court opinion interpreting the
scope of article X, section 2, was Gin S. Chow v. City of Santa
Barbara.'92 The case was an unlikely vehicle for the first pronounce-
ment of the scope of this important new provision. It is clear that
the case would have been decided in the same manner everi if the
amendment had been rejected by the voters. The Supreme Court's
new majority, however, was ready to accept any invitation to
thoroughly repudiate the Herminghaus doctrine.
interpreted as a beneficial use of the waters in this semi arid state, where all lands,
including riparian lands, need artificial irrigation in summer and fall, and all our
cities need stored water for domestic use.
Under present interpretations, the riparian owner is not bound by any rule of
reasonableness in the use of water.
For example, in the Herminghaus case, it was held that approximately 97 percent
of the water of the streams should flow by the land, in order that 3 percent might
be used for irrigation.
The development of California requires that a different rule from this be adopted.
The amendment preserves to the riparian owner all of the water to which he may
be entitled for beneficial use by reasonable methods of use, but requires that the
unwarranted and needless waste of water should be prevented.
This is a common sense rule of the utmost importance to, and should be adopted
for, the future growth of our state and cities.
Id. (emphasis added).
In contrast, Wiel had argued that "waste" only encompassed "man-made losses, occurring
after the water has been taken out of its natural channel. The individual has then assumed
control of it and can properly be held responsible, at least to a considerable degree, for his
good or bad handling of it. That is his own conduct." The Pending Water Amendment, supra
note 126, at 186 (emphasis deleted). "Losses which are natural are necessarily unavoidable until
such time as we can find a way of penalizing the Almighty, who is the guilty party." Id.
190. The votes for passage totalled 913, 125; the votes against were only 270, 163. Statement
of Vote of California 33 (Nov. 6, 1928).
191. While an investigation and discussion of California's social makeup during the late
1920s and early 1930's is beyond the scope of this article, one can hypothesize that the
amendment's adoption and the judicial attitude evidenced by the cases which will be discussed
infra reflected the significant social changes which accompanied the State's rapid economic
and population growth. This growth created needs for water on vast areas of land which while
fertile or valuable for urban growth, did not enjoy riparian status. Under these circumstances
the Herminghaus doctrine was unlikely to and did not survive. In addition, by the time the
first post-amendment case was decided only two members of the Herminghaus majority
remained on the Court. However, Justice Shenk, the author of the strong Herminghaus dissent,
was still on the Court and represented the new majority.
192. 217 Cal. 673, 22 P. 2d 5 (1933).
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Gin Chow involved plans by Montecito County Water District to
construct Juncal Dam and Reservoir on Santa Ynez River and a
conveyance tunnel through the mountains to the growing areas just
south of Santa Barbara. A lawsuit was brought by downstream
riparians to enjoin the District's diversion to the coastal Santa
Barbara area. After trial, the riparians were denied any relief based
upon lengthy findings of fact. In particular, the court found that the
disputed waters were unusual flood water "in excess of the regularly
recurring and of the usual, ordinary and customary flow of said
iver....
The case was appealed on the judgment roll and the findings were
accepted as true. As a result, the trial court's characterization of the
waters as flood waters was dispositive. Even under all of the pre-
amendment cases,' 94 including Herminghaus, riparian rights did not
attach to extraordinary flood waters. 195 Thus, these waters were
surplus, and available for appropriation by the District, even before
passage of the amendment.
Therefore, the California courts first analyzed article X, section 2,
in the context of a trial court decision rendered prior to the amend-
ment's adoption which had, nevertheless, upheld an appropriator's
right against downstream riparian claims. Justice Shenk wrote boldly
and broadly:
[The amendment's] language is plain and unambiguous. In the main
it is an endeavor on the part of the people of the state, through its
fundamental law, to conserve a great natural resource, and thereby
render available for beneficial use that portion of the waters of our
rivers and streams which, under the old riparian doctrine, was of
no substantial benefit to the riparian owner and the conservation
of which will result in no material injury to his riparian right, and
without which conservation such waters would be wasted and forever
lost. It was because this court felt impelled to adhere to the long-
established rule of Lux v. Haggin that a constitutional amendment
was made necessary. Upon the adoption of the amendment, it
superseded all state laws inconsistent therewith. 19 6
He then continued:
It requires no extraordinary foresight to envision the great and
increasing population of the state and its further agricultural and
193. 217 Cal. at 682, 22 P.2d at 8.
194. See id.
195. See, e.g., Herminghaus v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 991, 103, 251 P.
607, 612, 619 (1926).
196. 217 Cal. at 700, 22 P.2d at 16 (citations omitted),
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industrial enterprises dependent upon stored water-water that is
now wasted into the sea and lost to any beneficial use. The con-
servation of other natural resources is of importance, but the
conservation of the waters of the state is of transcendent importance.
Its waters are the very life blood of its existence. The police power
is an attribute of sovereignty and is founded on the duty of the
state to protect its citizens and provide for the safety, good order
and well being of society. It is coextensive with the right of self-
preservation in the individual. 197
These phrases have appeared repeatedly in later cases that discuss
the constitutional amendment; but Gin Chow's other passages re-
flecting the court's recognition that the amendment did not divest
riparian owners of their vested property rights are seldom quoted.
Justice Shenk wrote that the amendment "is an effort 'on the part
of the state, in the interest of the people of the state, to conserve
our waters' without interference with the beneficial uses to which
such waters may be put by the owners of water rights, including
riparian owners.' 1
While the court's language in Gin Chow gave the amendment a
broad scope, most of it was dicta. The decision "took" nothing
from the riparian owners since even prior to 1928 they had no rights
under common law to these flood waters. From a vantage point
more than 50 years after the case, the decision to appeal on the
judgment roll is surprising given the content of the trial court's
findings.
Less than two years after Gin Chow, Justice Shenk, in Peabody
v. City of Vallejo,1" had a second opportunity to review the amend-
ment. Peabody, however, squarely required full consideration of the
amendment's scope. The trial court had enjoined the City of Vallejo
from operating a dam on a small stream in Solano County. It found
that the entire flow of the stream was required to serve plaintiffs'
riparian needs and that "the impounding of any portion of these
waters by the defendant would result in material and substantial
damage to the plaintiffs...."200
Vallejo only proposed to impound water during high flow periods.
The evidence showed that the additional benefits which the riparians
were gaining by receiving the entire flow of the stream, rather than
197. Id. at 702, 22 P.2d at 16.
198. Id. at 700, 22 P.2d at 16 (emphasis added).
199. 2 Cal. 2d 351, 40 P.2d 486 (1935).
200. Id. at 362, 40 P.2d at 489.
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the entire flow minus the impounded high flows, were quite small.
Thus, the applicability of the reasonableness doctrine to competition
between riparians and appropriators was squarely before the court.201
In Peabody, the Supreme Court specifically ruled that article X,
section 2, had extended the reasonableness test to competing riparians
and appropriators:
The right to the waste of water is not now included in the riparian
right. As to what is waste water depends on the circumstances of
each case and the time when waste is required to be prevented. In
sections of the state, few in number, where the rivers and streams
are plentifully supplied, and there is no need for the conservation
of the product thereof, the water flows freely to the sea. When
needed for beneficial uses it may be stored or restrained by appro-
priation subject to the rights of those who have a lawful priority
in a reasonable beneficial use. That priority has been subjected to
limitations and regulations prescribed by the Constitution, but it
has by no means been abolished. Under the new policy the vested
right theory, that is, the right of the riparian owner to all of the
waters of the stream as it is wont to flow in the state of nature,
and without regard to the reasonableness of such use as against an
appropriator, has been subjected to such limitations that the old
doctrine declared in Miller & Lux v. Madera Canal & Irr. Co., 155
Cal. 59 [99 Pac. 502, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 391], is no longer the law
of this state. Also distinctions heretofore made between the unusual
or extraordinary and the usual or ordinary flood and freshest waters
of a stream are no longer applicable. 202
While Peabody is extremely important for its clear development
and articulation of the constitutional amendment's primary impact,
the context within which the decision was rendered must be kept in
focus. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court because the trial
court judge had ruled in favor of the riparians without determining
whether the riparians' uses or methods were reasonable in the context
before him. The trial judge had believed that the amendment had
not changed the old rule that no reasonableness constraint applied
to a riparian-appropriator conflict. Under these circumstances the
Supreme Court could not and, with one exception, 203 did not deter-
201. See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text for a discussion of the preexisting
judicially declared reasonableness doctrine between competing riparians and between competing
appropriators.
202. Peabody, 2 Cal. 2d at 368, 40 P.2d at 492.
203. While Peabody is best classed as a case dealing with methods of use of diversion,
and not with the reasonableness of the uses themselves, there is one notable exception. The
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mine if the riparians' use or methods of use were reasonable. The
court therefore could only remand to the lower court for a trial on
the factual issues necessary to determine reasonableness. Along the
way it tried to provide as much legal guidance as the record before
it allowed.
In guiding the trial court, the Peabody opinion clearly signaled
that a decision upholding the reasonableness of the riparians' methods
of use would be viewed with extreme disfavor.204 Yet the opinion
also demonstrated that at this stage in California's water history the
judiciary was still concerned with the need to treat the right to use
water as vested property. For example, the court cited Burr v. Maclay
Rancho Water Co. °5 as follows:
The court unquestionably has the power to make reasonable regu-
lations for the use of such water by the respective parties, fixing
the times when each may take it and the quantity to be taken,
provided they be adequate to protect the person having the para-
mount right in the substantial enjoyment of that right and to prevent
its ultimate destruction.206
After a lengthy discussion of an overlying owner's right to receive
the flows needed to protect this underground supply, the court
continued:
There is and should be no endeavor to take from a water right the
protection to which it is justly entitled. The preferential and para-
mount rights of the riparian owner, the owner of an underground
and percolating water right, and the prior appropriator are entitled
to the protection of the courts at law or in equity .... If the
exercise of the appropriative right cause a substantial diminution of
the supply the owner is entitled to compensation for the resulting
damage to his lands.207
The Peabody court was also confronted by an argument that
Antioch v. Williams Irrigation District20 required a ruling "that mere
court explicitly ruled that to demand that the full flood flow of the stream overflow onto
one's land to deposit silt or remove the saline content of the soil "involves an unreasonable
use or an unreasonable method of use or an unreasonable method of diversion of water as
contemplated by the Constitution." Id. at 369 40 P.2d at 492. This statement, however, may
be classified as dictum, as the court also stated, "So far as we are advised, this asserted right
does not inhere in the riparian at common law, and as a natural right cannot be asserted as
against the police power of the state in the conservation of its waters." Id.
204. See id. at 364, 375-76.
205. 154 Cal. 428, 98 P. 260 (1908).
206. 2 Cal.2d at 371, 40 P.2d at 493 (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 374, 40 P.2d at 494.
208. 188 Cal. 451, 205 P. 688 (1922).
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inconvenience or extra expense suffered by the overlying land owner
would not justify an absolute injunction, nor require that damages
for the interference with the right be paid.' ' The court distinguished
Antioch on its "unusual factual background." The court then con-
cluded: "Here again we state that any interference with the prior
right which would cause substantial damage is actionable." 210
Peqbody, thus, points in two directions. It established the universal
applicability of the reasonableness doctrine in California law; yet it
also adhered to the tradtional concept that any "substantial damage
[to a prior right] is actionable." 211 Peabody, therefore, supports the
conclusion that even after the amendment, water rights constitute
compensable property.
The third case decided in the amendment's first decade was Tulare
Irrigation District v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District.212 Tulare
involved competing claims of riparian/overlying owners and appro-
priators of surface and subsurface flows of the Kaweah River. While
it added little to the rules declared in Peabody, several significant
holdings appear in the opinion.
First, the case described for the first time the type of trial court
proceedings and findings which are now the hallmark of water right
adjudications. The court ruled that the trial judge must quantify the
amount of water reasonably needed by the riparians so the amount
of water available to appropriators can also be determined. 2 3 Second,
209. Peabody, 2 Cal. 2d at 376, 40 P.2d at 495-96.
210. Id. at 376-77, 40 P.2d at 496 (emphasis in Peabody). It is sometimes implicitly assumed
that the rule of reasonableness was a new concept first articulated in article X, section 2.
Therefore, the pre-1928 decisions are sometimes treated as objects of historical interest only.
See supra notes 143-63 and accompanying text. The Peabody case demonstrates the error of
this approach. Its use of Burr v. McClay Rancho Water Co. and Waterford Irrigation District
v. Turlock Irrigation District demonstrates that the Supreme Court viewed article X, section
2, as extending the preexisting reasonableness doctrine to a new category of competing water
rights. It is clear from the way this quotation from Peabody uses the Waterford Irrigation
District case that the California Supreme Court in 1935 did not believe that the 1928
constitutional amendment had created any greater reasonableness burden on riparians than
had been placed on senior appropriators by the courts through the pre-1928 cases. It is,
therefore, proper to measure the change in judicial deference to vested property rights in water
by comparing the pre-1928 and post-1928 decisions and to treat the constitutional amendment
as a constitutional codification of an existing rule and an extension of that rule to a new
group of water users.
211. Id. at 377, 40 P.2d at 496.
212. 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935).
213. It is now necessary for the trial court to determine whether such owners,
considering all the needs of those in the particular water field, are putting the waters
to any reasonable beneficial uses, giving consideration to all factors involved,
including reasonable methods of use and reasonable methods of diversion. From a
consideration of such uses, the trial court must then determine whether there is a
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the court held that unused (dormant) riparian rights must be pro-
tected, and when exercised, riparians retain their superiority over
appropriative rights. 214 Finally, the court rejected the riparians' de-
mand that sufficient flow remain in the river to allow them to
subirrigate their property naturally. The court found that claim to
be unreasonable "in an area of such need as the Kaweah Delta.
'215
The fourth case decided in this early period, City of Lodi v. East
Bay Municipal Utility District,2 6 has been largely ignored in subse-
quent cases and by most commentators writing in this area. Yet, it
contains some of the most illuminating language concerning the
Supreme Court's continued adherence to traditional vested property
based concepts even after Article 10, section 2 had been passed.
Lodi involved construction by the East Bay Municipal Utility
District of Pardee Reservoir on the Mokelumne River in the moun-
tains east of the City of Lodi. For some years prior to the litigation,
the City had obtained its municipal water supply from groundwater
aquifers which the trial court found were replenished almost exclu-
sively by the river's flow, The City, therefore, sought to enjoin any
operation of the District's facilities that would impair percolation of
surface and subsurface river flows into the aquifer which supported
surplus in the water field subject to appropriation. If the riparian is putting the
water to any reasonable beneficial uses, it is now necessary for the trial court to
find expressly the quantity so required and so used. A finding.. .to the effect that
the riparian requires a "reasonable" amount for such uses, under the new doctrine,
is clearly insufficient. . . .The trial court, under the new doctrine, must fix the
quantity required by each riparian for his actual reasonable beneficial uses, the same
as it would do in the case of the appropriator.
3 Cal. 2d at 524-25, 45 P.2d at 986.
214. The new doctrine not only protects the actual reasonable beneficial uses of the
riparian but also the prospective reasonable beneficial uses of the riparian. As to
such future or prospective reasonable beneficial uses, it is quite obvious that the
quantity of water so required for such uses cannot be fLxed in amount until the
need for such use arises. Therefore, as to such uses, the trial court, in its findings
and judgment, should declare such prospective uses paramount to any right of the
appropriator.... The trial court might well... retain jurisdiction over the cause
so that when a riparian claims the need for water, the right to which was awarded
him under such a declaratory decree, the trial court may determine whether the
proposed new use under all the circumstances, is a reasonable beneficial use, and,
if so, the quantity required for such use.
3 Cal. 2d at 525, 45 P.2d at 986.
215. Id. at 526, 45 P.2d at 987.
The further finding that each riparian requires the "whole of the under underground
flow of said stream... to moisten said land from beneath," etc., is not sufficient
under the new doctrine. The use of the entire flow of a stream, surface or
undergound, for subirrigation cannot be held to be a reasonable use of water in an
area of such need as the Kaweah Delta.
Id. (citations omitted).
216. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
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its diversions. At trial, both sides suggested differing physical solu-
tions which might mitigate or eliminate the damages claimed by the
City. However, the trial judge ruled that he lacked the authority
unilaterally to impose a physical solution and that a physical solution
was only proper if it was stipulated and agreed to by all parties. The
California Supreme Court, with Justice Shenk once again writing the
opinion, reversed. The court held that it is not only proper to
entertain evidence of physical solutions, it is constitutionally man-
dated. Further, "the court possessed the power to enforce such
solution regardless of whether the parties agree.''217
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court accepted certain
fundamental propositions related to the vested status of Lodi's prior
rights and the resulting cost burden of providing a physical solution.
First, the court accepted the lower court's finding that the District's
method of operation of Pardee Dam and Reservoir would, over a
period of years, lower the water table to the material injury of the
City.2 8 The court then recognized that the City's rights deserved full
protection even though "tremendous releases" were required and
that "[t]hose releases, after they serve the purpose of forcing a
relatively small quantity of water into the surrounding underground
water table, for the most part, waste into the sea." '219
In spite of these findings the court ruled that merely because
"Lodi's right is small as compared either with the District's wants
or the flow of the stream, in no way detracts from that right, which
is entitled to both legal and equitable protection. '220 The decision
then specifically addressed the cost allocation issues involved in a
physical solution:
If a physical solution is to be worked out which would require the
City to change its method of appropriation, any substantial expense
incidental thereto should be borne by the District. The City is a
prior appropriator and as such cannot be compelled to incur any
material expense in order to accommodate the subsequent appro-
priator. Although the prior appropriator may be required to make
minor changes in the method of appropriation in order to render
available water for subsequent appropriators, it cannot be compelled
to make major changes or to incur substantial expense.Y
217. Id. at 341, 60 P.2d at 450.
218. Id. at 339, 60 P.2d at 449.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 341, 60 P.2d at 450 (citations omitted).
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One final conclusion can be drawn from Lodi concerning prior
water rights and their entitlement to protection. The Supreme Court
discussed how the principles described above should be applied to
the specific facts before it. In doing so, the court pointed out that
the record conclusively established that the City's water supply had
not yet been materially diminished by the District's operations.2
2
Under these circumstances the court held:
The decree should then be reframed to provide that the duty rests
upon the District to maintain the levels of the plaintiff's wells above
the danger level so fixed by the trial court; that in the event the
levels of the wells reach the danger point, the duty be cast upon
the District to supply water to the City, or to raise the levels of
the wells above the danger mark; and if the District does not comply
with this order within a reasonable time, then the injunction decree
already framed, or upon a proper showing as modified by the court
under its continuing jurisdiction, shall go into effect.22
Thus, the Supreme Court believed that it was proper to impose
upon the City, as a prior appropriator, the burden of accepting some
increase in power costs caused by a decline in the level of the water
table as long as this decline did not reach the "danger point." At
that point, however, the City's duty to bear inconvenience would
end and the District's obligation to implement and pay for the
physical solution to protect the prior appropriator would begin. This
passage constitutes one of the few judicial pronouncements defining
the line between mere inconvenience and substantial expense.
The only California case which relies on Lodi is Erickson v. Queen
Valley Ranch.24 Erickson involved a dispute on Morris Creek, a
small interstate stream which flows from Nevada into Mono County,
California. The Ericksons and their predecessor had diverted and
used the full flow of Morris Creek on their nonriparian land since
1902.225 Many years after this California appropriation had vested,
the Nevada State Engineer granted a competing appropriation for
land in Nevada, subject to prior vested rights.2 26 The litigation was
filed after disputes arose concerning the extent of the Ericksons'
prior rights.
222. Id. at 343, 60 P.2d at 451.
223. Id. at 344, 60 P.2d at 452.
224. 22 Cal. App. 3d 578, 99 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1971).
225. Id. at 581, 99 Cal. Rptr at 447-48.
226. Id.
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The trial court ruled in favor of the Ericksons. It held that their
method of diversion and the conveyance losses associated therewith
were not unreasonable and were similar to the custom or practice
prevailing in the locality.227 These diversions, however, presented
striking circumstances:
According to measurements .. the Pedro ditch contained a flow
of 2.585 cubic feet per second at a point 100 yards below the
diversion dam, while only 0.424 cubic feet per second was delivered
at the Pedro Ranch. The major part, that is, five-sixths of the flow
was lost en route to the point of use. m
Thus, this case involved the reasonableness of a method of diversion
and the financial responsibility for implementing a physical solution
when approximately eighty-three percent of the water diverted was
lost in transit! In a series of passages, the appellate court found that
the Ericksons' method of conveyance was wasteful, yet placed the
burden of paying for system improvements on the junior appropri-
ator. The court ruled:
Plaintiffs' existing appropriative right is measured not by the flow
originally appropriated and not by the capacity of the diversion
ditch, but by the amount of water put to beneficial use at the
delivery point plus such additional flow as is reasonably necessary
to deliver it....
An appropriator cannot be compelled to divert according to the
most scientific methods; he is entitled to make a reasonable use of
the water according to the general custom of the locality, so long
as the custom does not involve unnecessary waste.
Article [X], section [2], of the California Constitution declares
the state's policy to achieve maximum beneficial use of water and
prevention of waste, unreasonable use and unreasonable method of
use. The constitutional policy applies to every water right and every
method of diversion. It imposes upon trial courts an affirmative
duty to fashion a decree which will simultaneously protect the
paramount right of established appropriator and prevent waste.
The findings and decree in this case fall to accomplish the second
of these objectives. By holding that transmission losses amounting
to five-sixths of the flow are reasonable and consistent with local
custom, the court effectually placed the seal of judicial approval
on what appears to be an inefficient and wasteful means of trans-
227. Id. at 582, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 448.
228. Id. at 584, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 450.
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mission. Such a holding is not in conformity with the demands of
article [XI, section [2].
It is doubtless true that water in the arid desert areas of Mono
County is frequently transported by open ditch; also, that much of
the flow may be lost by absorption and evaporation. Moreover, an
appropriator who has for many years conveyed water by early
ditches may not be compelled at his own expense to install imper-
vious conduit. Nevertheless, an excessive diversion of water for any
purpose is not a diversion for beneficial use. Water of Morris Creek
which is presently wasted becomes excess water available for appro-
priation. Another would-be appropriator may be willing to invest
in a more efficient conveyance system in order to capture and use
the water now lost en route. 9
These fascinating passages use terms such as "waste" and "exces-
sive diversion" but seem to carefully and intentionally refrain from
finding that the Ericksons' conveyance practices were constitutionally
unreasonable. If the court had found that the senior right holders
(the Ericksons) were acting unreasonably, the court would also have
been required to find that no water right attached to the unreasonably
wasted water and that the would-be junior appropriator could take
the water without impairing any protectable interest of the seniors.
In particular, the junior would have had no obligation to construct,
at its expense, a physical solution.3 0 Indeed, only after the senior
rights holders' activities have ben found reasonable should the court
determine whether a judicially imposed or supervised physical solution
would reduce waste and thereby further the policies of article X,
section 2.
By so carefully distinguishing waste from unreasonable behavior,
Erickson raised more important issues which should have been, but
were not, considered in the Forni case discussed below. Erickson is
by far the most recent statement of the long established California
doctrine that custom and usage are relevant to a reasonableness
inquiry. Erickson also reiterates that a senior rights holder, even
though his methods of diversion and use may result in some loss,
may not be compelled at his own expense to improve an otherwise
reasonable method of diversion or use to make the water lost during
conveyance or use available to a third party.23'
229. Id. at 584-85, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 449-50 (citations deleted).
230. See supra notes 143-63, 216-23 and accompanying text.
231. Erickson, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 584, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 449. See Tulare Dist. v. Lindsay-
Strathmore Dist. 3 Cal. 2d 489, 547, 45 P.2d 972, 976 (1935).
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Tulare, Lodi and Erickson demonstrate that many learned justices
believed that these concepts survived the passage of article X, section
2. Yet as discussed below, the doctrine is not even mentioned in the
pivotal Forni decision.
The Gin Chow, Peabody, Tulare and City of Lodi decisions
represent a fair overview of contemporary opinion in the 1930s as
to the intended sweep of article X, section 2. It was intended to
redefine the private property scope of riparian rights and to limit
them in the same manner as both appropriative rights and correlative
riparian rights had been limited years before. However, the perceived
scope of the redefinition was relatively minor. It primarily prevented
the riparian from demanding that vast quantities of water and high
springtime water volume flow past his property so the natural over-
flow could irrigate the land without the expense of constructing and
operating headworks and canals. But in circumstances where the
riparian (or for that matter an appropriator) had constructed ditches
or flumes or other customarily used conveyance facilities, the courts
were very hesitant to demand that the senior rights holder take
substantial or expensive steps for the sole purpose of making water
available for a junior use. Thus, the early cases, and the later
Erickson decision, distinguished waste from unreasonable use. They
recognized that all water use entails some losses which one could call
waste. However, if the loss (waste) was not excessive and the method
of diversion and use was customary, the courts refused to equate the
waste with constitutionally unreasonable conduct. Under those con-
ditions the obligation to pay for facilities to eliminate the waste was
cast onto the junior appropriator. Any other result would, in the
opinion of those courts, improperly invade the private property rights
of the senior water user.
The next series of cases radically altered nearly one hundred years
of precedent. Although chronologically out of sequence, we begin
with State Water Resources Control Board v. Forni.2 2 Forni involved
Napa River water used for vineyard frost protection. This important
case is inconsistent with the Lodi decision in its approach to allocating
the cost of a physical solution.
Forni involved regulations adopted by the State Water Resources
Control Board (Board) which read:
Because of the high instantaneous demand for water in the Napa
River in Napa County for frost protection and the inadequacy of
232. 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851 (1976).
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the supply to satisfy the demand during the frost season after March
15 in most years, diversion of water from the Napa River after
March 15 for frost protection except to replenish water stored in
reservoirs prior to March 15 is an unreasonable method of diversion
within the meaning of Article [X], Section [2] of the California
Constitution and Section 100 of the Water Code. No permits for
the appropriation of water from the Napa River after March 15 of
any year for frost protection shall be granted except to replenish
winter storage and such permits shall not be granted until a water
distribution program among the water users is established that will
assure protection to prior rights. Regardless of the source of the
water, the Board will retain jurisdiction to revise the terms and
conditions of all permits issued for frost protection should future
conditions warrant.23
While the second sentence of this regulation established guidelines
for considering new applications to appropriate frost protection water
from the Napa River, the first sentence was interpreted by the Board
to apply to riparian diversions. Thus, in place of direct diversions
within riparian rights, the Board sought to require riparians to build
storage facilities under appropriative rights. The Board sued the
riparian owners to enjoin their diversions for frost protection as an
unreasonable method of use. The riparian landowners sought judg-
ment on the pleadings, arguing that the regulation was invalid as a
matter of law. The motion was granted and the Board's regulation
was ruled invalid.2 4
Since the trial court had, in essence, sustained a demurrer to the
Board's complaint, the primary question before the appellate court
was whether the complaint stated a cause of action. The court of
appeal found that the reasonableness of the riparians' methods of
diverting for frost protection raised a question of fact that "renders
the judgment on the pleadings erroneous as a matter of law. ' ' 2 5 The
appellate court, however, did not, and could not without a factual
record, decide that the riparians could be required to pay the cost
of the required reservoirs. Instead, the court merely asserted:
As we have repeatedly underscored, the overriding constitutional
consideration is to put the water resources of the state to a reason-
able use and make them available for the constantly increasing needs
of all the people. In order to attain this objective, the riparian
233. Id. at 752 n.4, 126 Cal. Rptr. 857 n.4.
234. Id. at 751.
235. Id.
1083
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 19
owners may properly be required to endure some inconvenience or
to incur reasonable expenses. Whether the requirement of building
water reservoirs in the case at bench is the only feasible method
for achieving the constitutional mandate of reasonableness is man-
ifestly a question of fact.2 6
While this quotation cites the earlier cases which hold that the
riparians' obligation is to bear only "some" inconvenience and
"reasonable" expense, the quotation's last sentence is inconsistent
with City of Lodi v. East Bay Municipal Utility District.37 Forni
states the test as whether the "building [of] reservoirs... is the only
feasible method for achieving the constitutional mandate of reason-
ableness."2 18 To be consistent with Lodi, however, Forni should have
also referenced the physical solution doctrine and dealt with the
Supreme Court's Lodi ruling: if the physical solution requires the
holder of the prior right to change its method of appropriation, the
subsequent appropriator should bear any substantial expense incident
thereto.239
The failure of Forni to discuss, much less recognize the existence
of the physical solution cases is one of its most significant aspects.
Forni suggests the automatic equation of "waste," or any inefficiency
which impacts a stream's potential for maximum development, with
unconstitutional conduct. If this is Forni's holding, private property
interests in water have been significantly redefined.
236. Id. at 751-52, 126 Cal. Rptr. 856 (citations omitted). One of the more unusual aspects
of this passage is the Forni court's apparent assumption that the riparians could utilize storage
reservoirs pursuant to their riparian rights. In fact, the riparian right does include a regulatory
storage right. CAL. ADMu,. CODE tit. 23, § 657 (1987). Regulatory storage, however, is defined
as storage for 30 days or less and does not include storage in one season for use during
another season. Id. The court failed to address whether the reservoir use contemplated by the
Board's regulation was within the scope of the riparian right; instead it seem simply to assume
so. After remand, Forni was settled prior to trial, so this element of the case was never
judicially decided. However, the settlement, in an innovative approach to a difficult problem,
treats the pre-March 15 diversions to storage as appropriations and the riparians were required
to file applications and obtain appropriative rights permits. Since during the winter season
there is usually enough water in the river to accommodate all of the diversions to storage, all
the applications were granted and there is sufficient water in the river to fill all the reservoirs
without disputes over priorities. Refilling the reservoirs after March 15, however, is treated as
a regulatory storage. The riparian owners are thus accorded a first priority for this water over
nonriparian water users during the time of year when water shortages are more likely to be a
problem. Interview with James T. Markle, Staff Counsel, State Water Resources Control
Board, March 22, 1988 (notes on file at the Pacific Law Journal). See also CAL. ADMIN. CODE
tit. 23, § 735(c).
237. 7 Cal. 2d 316, 60 P.2d 439 (1936).
238. 54 Cal. App. 3d at 752, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
239. 7 Cal. 2d at 341, 60 P.2d at 450.
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Forni's importance to contemporary California water law stems
equally from the role played by the Board. For some years prior to
filing its complaint in Forni, the Board had been gaining more
strength and stature as the administrative interpreter of article X,
section 2's mandate. In filing Forni, and in adopting the challenged
administrative regulation, the Board had made a rather fundamental
policy decision. Forni presented the Board with a situation in which
the Napa River apparently had insufficient water to serve, by direct
diversion, the legitimate needs of both riparian and non-riparian
vineyards. Faced with this shortage, the Board decided, in effect, to
equalize the relative priorities of the riparians and appropriators. It
thus sought to impose an equal obligation on all users, irrespective
of their priorities, to bear the cost of constructing needed storage
facilities. The Board apparently made no preliminary consideration
regarding the substantiality of the burden being placed on the ripar-
ians. Further, the Board apparently did not consider whether the
riparians' methods were customary and whether the regulation re-
quired a diverter "to change his system... so that others may perhaps
be benefited thereby.'"'2 In other words, there never seemed to be
any consideration of whether, as an alternative to the regulation, the
appropriators should pay for a physical solution. Instead the Board
boldly and unprecedentedly required cost sharing among identical
uses without regard to the "accident" of whether the benefited land
abutted the river or was located 500 yards inland.
After remand Forni was settled before trial. Therefore, no Cali-
fornia reported decision discusses the continued vitality of Lodi, or
applies Peabody's admonitions concerning the extent of the incon-
venience or expense that can be imposed on the owners of prior
vested water rights. 24 Although specific decisions may not be avail-
able, the direction in which the cases are moving is clear. On the
one hand, as long as sufficient water remains available to support
the beneficial uses under examination, the Board or the courts wili
assert nearly unfettered discretion to regulate the method of diversion
240. Compare Forni, 54 Cal. App. 3d 743, 126 Cal. Rptr. 851, with Southern Cal. Inv.
Co. v. Wilshire, 144 Cal. 68, 77 P.2d 767 (1904). If Forni is taken to its extreme, a riparian
would be required to undertake, from time to time, additional improvements to his diversion,
distribution, and delivery systems, at his sole cost, to make water available for newly developed
demands because "it is beneficial to the community in general." Southern Cal. Investment
Co., 144 Cal. at 73, 77 P.2d at 80. See infra notes and accompanying text. This extension of
Forni is even more striking when used to argue that the right itself is terminated.
241. Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351, 376-77, 40 P.2d 486, 495-96 (1935).
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or use. Further, the increased cost to a water rights holder from
such regulation is largely irrelevant.
On the other hand, the continued existence of the physical solution
cases provides an escape valve for certain difficult cases. If the court
does not want to impose the financial burden of constructing con-
servation facilities on the senior rights holder, it can simply find his
methods reasonable and shift the financial obligation to the junior
would-be appropriator.
3. The Purpose of Use Cases
While Forni deals with that portion of article X, section 2, which
regulates the way water is used for beneficial purposes, two recent
cases, Joslin v. Marin Municipal Water District242 and United States
v. State Water Resources Control Board,243 attack the fundamental
existence of a private property right in water.
Joslin is difficult to analyze logically. The Supreme Court's intent,
however, and the ruling's importance is unmistakable. The Court,
faced with a fact pattern that would have supported a three line
opinion citing Peabody, established instead a sweeping doctrine that
property rights in water had been redefined2" by "constitutional
fiat"' '45 to exclude unreasonable uses. Moreover, the Court declared
that "what is reasonable use ... cannot be resolved, in vacuo,
isolated from statewide importance.' '246
The plaintiff in Joslin sought damages for interference with his
riparian right to have Nicasio Creek deposit sand and gravel on his
land for subsequent extraction and sale. The defendant District's
upstream dam intercepted and held the suspended materials carried
by the creek, thereby eliminating the "normal and usual replenish-
ment of rocks and gravel" to plaintiff's property.4 7
The Supreme Court properly turned to Peabody v. Vallejo:
In Peabody, several lower riparian owners sought to enjoin the
City of Vallejo, as an appropriator, from storing the waters of a
creek by the construction of a dam and thereafter diverting them
242. 67 Cal. 2d 132, 60 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1967).
243. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 4Qal. Rptr. 161 (1986).
244. Joslin, 67 Cal. 2d at 144, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
245. Id. at 146, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
246. Id. at 140, 60 Cal. Rptr. 382.
247. Id. at 134, 35, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 379. The trial court granted summary judgment for
the District pursuant to a minute order "upon the grounds that there was no substantive right
of plaintiffs violated by defendant." The legal theory for the ruling was not set forth in the
trial court's order.
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to municipal uses. Peabody, one of the plaintiffs, asserted a right
to have all the waters flow without interruption since by normally
overflowing his land they not only deposited silt thereon but also
washed out salt deposits on portions of the land. The court held
that "this asserted right does not inhere in the riparian right at
common law, and as a natural right cannot be asserted as against
the police power of the state in the conservation of its waters. This
asserted right involves an unreasonable use or an unreasonable
method of use or an unreasonable method of diversion of water as
contemplated by the Constitution." (Peabody v. City of Vallejo, 2
Cal. 2d 351, 369)-a
The Supreme Court's opinion could have ended here. Peabody's
holding that silt deposition does not inhere in the riparian right fully
supported the trial court's ruling without a constitutional interpre-
tation. No legal difference appears between silt deposition and re-
plenishment of rocks and gravel. Further, if the last phrase of the
Peabody quotation is interpreted as a ruling that as a matter of
law-without the need for factual balancing-silt, rock, or gravel
deposition is an unreasonable use of water, that should also have
ended the inquiry and the opinion. 249 Despite the several available
nonconstitutional bases for deciding the case, the Supreme Court
went on and made broad quasi-legal and quasi-policy statements.
These statements were only necessary, however, if the Court was also
deciding that rock and gravel replenishment (1) is encompassed within
the riparian right and (2) can constitute a reasonable riparian use in
certain factual circumstances. If one does not make this assumption,
the vast majority of Joslin is dicta.
The analysis of Joslin's implications which follows assumes, ar-
guendo, that the plaintiff's riparian right included rock and gravel
replenishment and that, prior to the urban growth that made the
district's project necessary, the use of Nicasio Creek's water for
248. Id. at 139, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 382 (citations omitted). As indicated above, the Peabody
court took an unnecessary step in this quotation. If silt deposition is not included in the
riparian right as a matter of common law, the reference to the Constitution is surplusage; the
reasonableness doctrine presupposes a water right recognized by California law. See supra
notes and accompanying text.
249. The court, however, was faced with a case which was difficult to reconcile. Los
Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Abbott, 24 Cal. App. 2d 728, 76 P.2d 188 (1938). In
Abbott, the court sustained a condemnation award for loss of gravel replenishment caused by
construction of a concrete lined flood channel. Joslin weakly distinguishes Abbott, but did
not overrule the decision. See also Malakoff, Erosion of a Water Right or Just a Pile of
Sand, 5 CAL. W.L. REv. 44, 54-59 (1968).
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gravel depositon was reasonable. In other words, at some point prior
to the litigation, a vested property right existed.
The Supreme Court first reviewed the policy considerations relevant
to its reasonableness determination:
Although, as we have said, what is a reasonable use of water
depends on the circumstances of each case, such an inquiry cannot
be resolved in vacuo isolated from statewide considerations of
transcendent importance. Paramount among these we see the water
in this state, an inescapable reality of life quite apart from its
express recognition in the 1928 amendment. On the other hand,
unlike the unanimous policy pronouncements relative to the use and
conservation of natural waters, we are aware of none relative to
the supply and availability of sand, gravel and rock in commercial
quantities. Plaintiffs do not urge that the general welfare or public
interest requires that particular or exceptional measures be employed
to insure that such natural resources be made generally available
and should there be carefully conserved.
Is it "reasonable," then, that the riches of our streams, which
we are charged with conserving in the great public interest, are to
be dissipated in the amassing of mere sand and gravel which for
aught that appears subserves no public policy? We cannot deem
such a use to be in accord with the constitutional mandate that our
limited water resources be put only to those beneficial uses "to the
fullest extent to which they are capable," that "waste or unreason-
able use" be prevented, and that conservation be exercised "in the
interest of the people for the public welfare." (Cal. Const. art. [X],
§ [2].) We are satisfied that in the instant case the use of such
waters as an agent to expose or to carry and deposit sand, gravel
and rock, is as a matter of law unreasonable within the meaning
of the constitutional amendment. (See Peabody v. City of Vallejo,
2 Cal. 2d 351, 369.)2 0
After finding that plaintiff's use was unreasonable, the court elimi-
nated any right to compensation:
[Plaintiffs assert that the amendment] was only a procedural as
opposed to a substantive change in the law and had the effect of
merely denying injunctive relief to protect certain riparian uses....
While plaintiffs correctly argue that a property right cannot be
taken or damaged without just compensation, they ignore the ne-
cessity of first establishing the legal existence of a compensable
property interest. Such an interest consists in their right to the
reasonable use of the flow of the water. Their riparian rights attach
250. 67 Cal.2d at 104-41, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 382-83 (emphasis in original).
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to no more of the flow of the stream than that which is required
for such use. [Citation deleted.] As we said in Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v.
All Parties, [47 Cal. 2d 597, 623]: "Within the scope of reasonable
beneficial use, vested fights of the riparian owner continued to
attach to his land as a part and parcel of the land itself, and as
such was necessarily protected from unlawful encroachment by both
state and federal Constitutions. The result is that this vested right
as now defined may not be destroyed or infringed upon without
due process of law or without just compensation under either
Constitution." There is now no provision of law which authorizes
an unreasonable use or endows such use with the quality of a legally
protectible interest merely because it may be fortuitously beneficial
to the lands involvedY21
The court then concluded "that since there was and is no property
right in an unreasonable use there has been no taking or damaging
of property by the deprivation of such use and, accordingly, the
deprivation is not compensable. ' '1 2
These statements constitute a major redefinition of the private
property nature of water rights in California. The first two quoted
paragraphs compare, in pure public policy terms, the relative impor-
tance of water for use by the people of California in their expanding
agricultural and industrial enterprises with "the amassing of mere
sand and gravel which for aught that appears subserves no public
policy." 2s3 Both that comparison and the court's resulting conclusion
that Joslin's riparian right deserved no protection imply remarkable
and largely unprecedented redefinitions of traditional property con-
cepts. Joslin seems to hold that the issue of which competing water
user possesses the superior right is no longer to be decided by
reference to riparian rights or temporal priority, but by which water
use best serves perceived public policies at the time the dispute is
resolved.
Arguably Joslin is limitable to its peculiar facts of replenishing a
gravel pit and cannot be used to support a more expansive view.2 4
However, the decision in United States v. State Water Resources
Control Board,25 discussed below, shows that one appellate court
relied on the very language quoted above to conclude that Joslin
251. Id. at 143-44, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 385 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
252. Id. at 145, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
253. Id. at 140-41, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (emphasis in original).
254. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 22, at 60-61.
255. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr 161 (1986). See infra notes 257-64 and accom-
panying text.
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does countenance reprioritization of rights on the basis of social
utility.
One can replace gravel replenishment with any other water use and
speculate how Joslin's language applies. What if the plaintiffs were
irrigating a tobacco crop which was used to make cigarettes? Would
any public policy support protecting the water supply for a product
that causes cancer and heart disease, when the water is otherwise
needed to serve California's growing population and industrial base?
Has Joslin turned the Board and courts into super regulators, deter-
mining what crop or products are made, where made, and by whom
made?
The statement of the question is enough to illustrate the problem.
Absent use creating a nuisance, Anglo-American jurisprudence has
been very hesitant to change the definition of property based on one
particular court's view of proper social balancing. But that is exactly
what Joslin may authorize in the area of water rights. 2 6
256. There is one passage in Joslin which may enable the decision to be more narrowly
construed than described above. The Supreme Court was forced to distinguish the United
States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Gerlach Livestock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950).
Gerlach interpreted article X, section 2, and subsequent California cases, with respect to certain
riparians' rights to compensation for water taken for a federal reclamation project. 339 U.S.
at 751-55. Joslin distinguished Gerlach by stating:
Plaintiffs direct our attention to United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co. (1950)
[339 U.S. 725] as compelling a different conclusion. In that case riparian owners
sought compensation for the loss of irrigating waters which overflowed the banks
of the San Joaquin River onto their lands when the river flooded each year. There
was no question but that the use of water for irrigating riparian lands was a
reasonable use, within the meaning of the constitutional amendment. The court
concluded that the use in question was a property interest which survived the
amendment and was compensable.
Gerlach, of course, is distinguishable from the instant case in that plaintiffs here
are not making a use of the natural flow of waters which can be deemed reasonable,
and it was on the determination of a reasonable use that Gerlach turned....
67 Cal. 2d at 145, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 386. This distinction withstands scrutiny only if Joslin
applies just to situations closely analogous to gravel pits. The Gerlach plaintiffs sought
compensation for loss of their ability to irrigate their lands with water which naturally
overflowed the banks of the San Joaquin River during high spring flows. These flows were
to be eliminated by construction of Friant Dam, a component of the federal Central Valley
Project. In other words, they irrigated in exactly the same manner as the Herminghaus
plaintiffs irrigated. The United States Supreme Court, in spite of the similarity of both the
Gerlach facts to the Herminghaus facts and the post-Herminghaus passage of article X, section
2, sustained the riparians' rights to compensation. If the passage from Joslin quoted above is
read as approving Gerlach, it would confirm the Herminghaus plaintiffs' right to compensation
even after the amendment's adoption. Given how unlikely it is the Joslin Court intended that
such a result would follow (indeed Peabody asserts that the 1928 amendment overruled
Herminghaus), Joslin's discussion of Gerlach most likely merely distinguishes, in a very broad
way, a utilitarian balancing involving irrigation rights from a balancing involving less useful
"mere sand and gravel."
1090
1988 / Changing Judicial Attitudes
By defining the property right in water according to which uses
are held to be reasonable from time to time in view of other
competing demands for the same water, Joslin implies that public
acquisition of water rights (or at least. attempted acquisition) may be
accomplished in water short areas without compensating the owners
of land from which the needed water is taken. Why should a public
agency properly representing its tax payers/tax users agree to con-
demn needed water if it can circumvent compensation on mere
utilitarianism? Such an argument might assert, for example, that in
light of the extreme need for water by the residents of Metropolis,
it is constitutionally unreasonable to use that water for irrigating
surplus wheat and corn for cattle feed and that, therefore, no
compensable property right exists.
While it must be emphasized that no subsequent case has extended
Joslin beyond its possibly unique facts, the ability to construe the
decision narrowly has been severely undercut by the First District
Court of Appeal's monumental decision in United States v. State
Water Resources Control Board.257 Although the facts and holding
of this case are described in detail in Judge Robie's article in this
symposium, 28 the decision's significant discussion implicitly redefin-
ing property demands attention here.
Primarily, Racanelli interprets California's water quality and water
rights law as they relate to the complex, ongoing administrative
proceedings involving the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta and San
Francisco Bay. In two separate portions of the seventy page opinion,
however, the court describes its view of article X, section 2, and
Joslin.
One issue before the appellate court was the Board's authority to
modify appropriative water rights permits in a manner which could
reduce the quantity of water available to the rights holder. After
discussing certain reserved powers contained in the permits them-
selves, the court turned to the Board's powers under the state
constitution:
Independent of its reserved powers, we think the Board was
authorized to modify the permit terms under its power to prevent
waste or unreasonable use or methods of diversion of water. All
257. 182 Cal. App. 3d 82, 227 Cal. Rptr. 161 (1986). This decision has become commonly
known within the water bar as the "Racanelli decision" after its author. That term will be
used in this article.
258. Robie, The Delta Decisions-The Quiet Revolution in California Water Rights, 19 PAc.
L.J. 1111 (1988).
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water rights, including appropriative, are subject to the overriding
constitutional limitation that water use must be reasonable. The
Board is expressly commissioned to carry out that policy....
Here, the Board determined that changed circumstances revealed
in new information about the adverse effects of the projects upon
the Delta necessitated revised water quality standards. Accordingly,
the Board had the authority to modify the projects' permits to
curtail their use of water on the ground that the projects' use and
diversion of the water had become unreasonable.
We perceive no legal obstacle to the Board's determination that
particular methods of use have become unreasonable by their del-
eterious effects upon water quality. Obviously, some accommodation
must be reached concerning the major public interests at stake: the
quality of valuable water resources and transport of adequate sup-
plies for needs southward. The decision is essentially a policy
judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public interests,
one the Board if uniquely qualified to make in view of its special
knowledge and expertise and its combined statewide responsibility
to allocate the rights to, and to control the quality of, state water
resources. We conclude, finally, that the Board's power to prevent
unreasonable methods of use should be broadly interpreted to enable
the Board to strike the proper balance between the interests in water
quality and project activities in order to objectively determine
whether a reasonable method of use is manifested. 2 1
This quotation extends Joslin to its logical extreme. Racanelli leaves
no vested property right in a water supply for any purpose.26° The
decision as to whether a particular water use is reasonable has become
"a policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public
interests. "261
The Racanelli pronouncements, while sweeping in scope, did not
shift water among competing users. The language quoted above was
used in a portion of the opinion dealing with the Board's jurisdiction
over the United States. It is, therefore, too early to judge how this
259. 182 Cal. App. 3d at 129-30, 227 Cal. Rptr. 187-88 (emphasis added, citations and
footnote deleted).
260. Unlike Joslin, which dealt with "mere gravel," Racanelli dealt with projects that
delivered irrigation water to several million acres of land and provided domestic municipal
and industrial water to millions of people.
261. 182. Cal. App. 3d at 130, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 188. The Racanelli decision has another
important attribute. It is the first case which deals expressly with competition between a
consumptive user and a water quality standard designed to protect instream values such as
fish and wildlife resources. The balancing doctrine announced in Racanelli likely extends to
non-quality related instream flow needs.
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language will be applied to specific fact situations in future cases.
However, an additional passage in Racanelli may presage how the
courts will interpret the Board's and the courts' powers to adjust
water rights to achieve the "best" balance of public interests. As
can be seen from the quotation immediately'above, Racanelli granted
the Board the power "to modify the projects' permits to curtail their
use of water ' 26 2 if their uses had become unreasonable. In another
section of the decision, the court stated:
Moreover, the power of the Board to set permit terms and
conditions (Water Code § 1253) includes the power to consider the
"relative benefit" to be derived. ([Water Code] § 1257.) If the
Board is authorized to weigh the values of competing beneficial
uses, then logically it should also be authorized to alter the historic
rule of "first in time, first in right" by imposing permit conditions
which give a higher priority to a more preferred beneficial use even
though later in time.263
This quotation does not cite article X, section 2, as authority.
Nevertheless, if a water use can be totally curtailed on constitutional
grounds, the less drastic step of altering relative priorities among
competing water uses to achieve a constitutional balance is also
permissible. Racanelli thus represents the current high watermark of
the post-1928 police power assault, under the reasonableness doctrine,
upon vested property rights in California water resources. 264
VI. THE USE OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AS A MEANS TO
Avom COMPENSATION FOR REALLOCATION OF PRIVATE INTEREST IN
WATER RESOURCES
In addition to substantial reliance upon the police power as a de
facto means of reallocating California's water supplies, recent Cali-
262. Id., 227 Cal. Rptr. at 187.
263. Id. at 132, 227 Cal. Rptr. 189.
264. Ironically, Racanelli cited Long Valley as partial support for the broad authority
granted the Board to adjust water use in the name of prevention of waste and unreasonable
use. Racanelli, 182 Cal. App. 3d at 144, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 198. In Long Valley, the California
Supreme Court allowed the Board, in the limited context of a statutory adjudication of all
rights in a stream system, to reprioritize dormant riparian fights. 25 Cal. 3d 339, 358-59 &
n.15, 599 P.2d 656, 669 & n.15, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 363 & n.15 (1979). Notably, the court
refused to uphold a Board decision to extinguish a dormant riparian claim. Id. at 357-59, 599
P.2d at 668-69, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 363-63. It did, however, allow the Board to give the dormant
riparian right the lowest priority of all claimants, regardless of the date of the riparian right's
inception. Id. It justified its action as "promot[ing] finality and certainty ." Id. at 359 n.15,
599 P.2d at 669 n.15, 158 Cal. Rptr. at 363 n.15. In contrast, Racanelli's extension of the
reprioritization principle, outside of the context of a stream wide, statutory adjudication,
effectively reduces certainty in all water rights. Cf. In re Water of Hallet Creek Stream System,
44 Cal. 3d 448, 470-72 & n.16 749 P. 324, 337 & n.16, 243 Cal. Rptr. 887, 890 & n.16 (1988).
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fornia decisions have also relied upon expanded public trust doctrine
to authorize state water reallocation without just compensation to
the water rights holders. 265 Historically confined to navigable waters,
the doctrine in recent years has shed its navigable past in hopes of
a greater non-navigable future.266 While some have argued that the
California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society v.
Superior Court267 represents "the consistent evolution of California
water rights, ' 268 others have attacked the decision as having "a
greater destabilizing effect on California water rights than any single
development since the initial recognition of riparian rights 100 years
ago. ' 269 The outworkings of National Audubon Society and the
relationship to takings law remain unaddressed judicially. 270
Whereas judicial manipulation of the reasonableness doctrine rests
upon the state's police power, the assertion of the public trust
doctrine appeals to another source of supposed state power: a pre-
existing state title in the water rights conveyed. 271 Whether the the-
265. Over the last two decades, an extensive literature on the origins, history and significance
of the doctrine has sprung up, largely in response to Professor Joseph Sax's provocative work,
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MicH.
L. Ray. 471 (1970) [hereinafter Sax]. Perhaps the most extensive discussion of the Roman,
civilian, and common law origins and articulations of the trust doctrine can be found in H.
AJ.THAus, supra note 24. A partial but nonetheless extensive list of post-1970 articles advocating
trust values appears in Professor Richard Lazarus's recent article, Changing Conceptions of
Property and Sovereignty in Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71
IOWA L. Rnv. 631, 643-44 n.75-76 (1986) [hereinafter Lazarus]. Professor Lazarus' article also
lists over 50 cases arising since 1970 raising public trust issues. Id. at 644-46 n.77-81.
266. In National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346,
658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983), the court extended the public trust doctrine
to non-navigable tributaries of navigable streams. The court also extended the doctrine to
disturb longstanding state licensed appropriative rights held by a major public water supply.
267. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
268. Smith, The Public Trust Doctrine and National Audubon Society v. Superior Court:
A Hard Case Makes Bad Law or the Consistent Evolution of California Water Rights, 6
GLENDAL L. REv. 201 (1984) [hereinafter Smith].
269. Goldsmith & Colonne, The California Public Trust Doctrine - Unsettled Law, Unsettled
Rights, 4 CAL. REAL PROP. J. 13, 13 (1986) [hereinafter Unsettled Law, Unsettled Rights].
270. Following the California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon Society, the
real party in interest, the City of Los Angeles, moved for a writ of certiorari in the United
States Supreme Court on the takings issue. The Supreme Court, however, denied the writ
without comment. 464 U.S. 977 (1983). See Note, The Fifth Amendment as a Limitation on
the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 PAC. L.J. 1291 (1984) [hereinafter Fifth Amendment
271. See, e.g., Lazarus, supra note 265, at 665 n.214-20, 674-75, 701-02. See also, National
Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 437-40, 658 P.2d at 721-23, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358-60.
Historically, the public trust doctrine arose out of state ownership of lands underlying navigable
waters. See, e.g., H. ALrT~us, supra note 24, at 71. Some theorists, however, argue that the
state's interest comes from principles of sovereignty rather than on any state proprietary
interest. See, e.g., Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The
Wrong EnvironmentalRemedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 63, 83-84 (1982) [hereinafter Walston].
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oretical source of the state's pre-existing interest is as a proprietor
or as a sovereign, enormous effects result from its assertion. Like a
slumbering giant, the public trust can rise up at any moment and
rearrange otherwise long settled arrangements in water resources
simply because of a new legislature, administrator or judge.
In its original 19th century formulations, the public trust doctrine
had little of its current sweep. Originally, cases that implicated the
public trust doctrine involved questions of
ownership to lands submerged under tidal or navigable waters. 272 For
example, the earliest 19th century cases from the United States
involved grants by a state of interests in oyster beds. In Arnold v.
Mundi,273 the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled that the state could
not deed away the public's interest in the rights to the beds of
navigable waters held in trust for its citizens.27 4 In ensuing litigation
during the remainder of the 19th century, courts attempted to explore
the circumstances under which a state might convey away its interest
in such lands underlying navigable waterways. 275
No discussion of the history of the public trust doctrine in the
United States would be complete without mention of Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois. 76 In that case, the United States Supreme Court
upheld the Illinois legislature's power to revoke a grant of tidal and
submerged lands on the Chicago water front.277 In sweeping language,
In practice, the distinction between the state's asserted proprietary interests and the state's
sovereign interests blurs. See, e.g., State Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166, at 597
(discussing state's "sovereign ownership interests"). Furthermore, the relationship between the
police power and the sovereignty interest also remains conceptually undefined. Compare SAX,
supra note 265, at 484-85 (public trust is an aspect of a state's police power) with State
Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166, at 596 (police power characterized by affirmative
conduct furthering public health, safety and welfare; public trust doctrine constrains states
actions even though they might further public health, safety and welfare).
272. The United States Supreme Court recently addressed the scope of the doctrine's
application over tidal but non-navigable waterways. In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi
& Sage Petroleum U.S., Inc., 108 S. Ct. 791 (1988), the Court announced that state ownership
extends to all lands beneath waters subject to the tide's influence whether or not navigable-
in-fact. Id. at 795. The court thus ruled that American common law had rejected the English
rule limiting sovereign ownership to lands lying under navigable waters. Id. at 794-95.
273. 6 N.J.L. 1 (1821).
274. Id. at 78.
275. See, e.g., Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842) (refusing to find
implied grant of state's sovereign interest).
276. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
277. The Supreme Court's language in Illinois Central exemplifies the 19th century public
trust doctrine's blend of sovereignty and proprietorship. For example, when comparing the
Great Lakes to tidal waters, the Court states:
We hold, therefore, that the same doctrine as to the dominion and sovereignty over
an ownership of lands under the navigable waters of the Great Lakes applies which
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the four justices of the court's majority2s distinguished the state's
title in submerged lands from its title in other public lands.2 79 The
court approved in principle grants of small portions of trust affected
land that facilitated improvements to further trust purposes.280 Fur-
ther, the court approved conveyance of parcels of submerged lands
that could be "disposed without any substantial impairment of the
public interest in the lands and waters remaining." 28 1 But the court
refused to "sanction the abdication of the general control of the
state over lands under the navigable waters of an entire harbor or
bay, or of a sea or lake. ' ' 2 Thus, the court principally objected to
the grant of an entire lakefront harbor equivalent in size to any of
the world's greatest harbors.28 3 The court, however, did not hold that
the grant was void on its face. 214
The public trust doctrine as announced in Illinois Central has been
refined in many American jurisdictions. 85 California has developed
it most extensively. 286 A substantial line of California cases addressed
traditional trust concerns over state ownership or grants of tidal and
submerged lands.2 7 These cases discuss traditional states' rights to
obtains at the common law as to the dominion and sovereignty over an ownership
of lands under tide waters on the borders of the sea, and that the lands are held
by the same right in the one case as in the other, and subject to the same trust and
limitations. Upon that theory we shall examine how far such dominion, sovereignty,
and proprietary right have been encroached upon by the railroad company, and how
far the company had at the time the assent of this date state to such encroach-
ment....
Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 436-37 (emphasis added).
278. The Court split 4 to 3; two justices did not participate. In dissent, Justice Shiras
argued that the state qua proprietor had as much right to convey its interest in submerged
lands as in any other public lands. Id. at 465. Justice Shiras argued that changed circumstances
would authorize the state to condemn previously conveyed submerged lands upon compensation.
Id. at 474.
279. Id. at 452.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 453.
282. Id. at 452-53.
283. Id. at 454-55.
284. Id. at 453. See Lazarus, supra note 263, at 638 ("The Court could have relied easily
on the theory that the initial enactment was devoid of legitimate public purpose, especially
given that the Court could have done so merely by referring to the subsequent legislature's
considered judgement."). Further, the Court noted that upon revocation of such a grant, the
state ought to pay for expenses incurred and improvements made while he grantee held the
property. Illinois Cent., 146 U.S. at 455.
285. See, e.g., cases cited in Lazarus, supra note 263, at 644-46 n.77. See also State
Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166, at 594-95 n.74 (additional recent authorities).
286. State Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166, at 590.
287. See, e.g., City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal.
Rptr. 327, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462,
476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970). Other cases have involved the incidents of retained
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control navigation, fishing, or commerce over submerged lands granted
away by the State. Another class of cases involves the State's ability
to prioritize between competing public trust uses. 211
The most significant developments in California law, however,
have come from extensions of both the interests protected by the
doctrine and the private rights it controls. For example, in Marks v.
Whitney,289 the court extended the interests protected to include
recreational and an aesthetic concerns .29 In State v. Superior Court
(Fogerty),291 the California Supreme Court extended the zone of
public trust protection to lands underlying navigable waters that had
been artificially raised by an impoundment. 292 The broadest extension
of the doctrine, however, came in the landmark case of National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court.293
The National Audubon Society case has already prompted extensive
discussion by commentators. 294 Its facts and principles are already
well known in the water community. Briefly, in National Audubon
Society, the California Supreme Court extended the state's public
trust control to diversions from non-navigable tributaries of navigable
waterways. 295 Although the diverter, the City of Los Angeles, held
valid state appropriative water rights licenses dating back nearly forty
years, the court held that under the public trust doctrine the City's
permits created no vested rights that barred reconsideration of the
diversion's propriety.296 Moreover, the court announced that the state
may reconsider even those allocations that had previously included
public trust review.297
state control over submerged lands otherwise properly conveyed. See, e.g., People v. California
Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913) (nuisance case discussing trust interest in fish).
288. See, e.g., Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 432 P.2d 3, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1967)
(state had power to promote commerce over navigation); Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500,
174 Cal. 622, 163 P. 1024 (1917) (state has power to destroy navigability of some waters for
the benefit of others); County of Orange v. Heim, 30 Cal. App. 3d 694, 106 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1973) (legislature has power to prefer one trust use over another). See Walston, supra note
269, at 71.
289. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
290. Id. at 259-60.
291. 29 Cal. 3d 240, 635 P. 2d 256, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1981).
292. Id. at 248-49. See also Fogerty v. State, 187 Cal. App. 3d 224, 231 Cal. Rptr. 810
(1986) (people of California acquired public trust rights in shore zone of artificially elevated
lake by prescription).
293. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
294. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 268; State Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166, at 591-95;
Unsettled Law, Unsettled Rights, supra note 269, at 13-17.
295. National Audubon Society, 33 Cal. 3d at 437.
296. Id. at 447, 189 Cal. Rptr. 365.
297. Id. The California Supreme Court embraced the sovereignty theory as the source of
the state's public trust powers. Id. at 445, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
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National Audubon Society's attempted accommodation between
the public trust doctrine and the appropriative water rights system
has left many questions unsettled about the scope of private property
interests in California water rights. Three questions are primary.
First, the opinion does not itself address the impact of the public
trust doctrine upon other state recognized water rights. 298 The Ra-
canelli decision, however, suggests that the public trust doctrine, at
least in combination with the police power, authorizes the state to
reconsider and reprioritize any water right. Second, National Audu-
bon Society does not establish a rule for determining who among all
the water rights holders on a watercourse must bear any flows
necessary to satisfy a reallocation under the public trust doctrine.
Alternatives include equitable apportionment among all water rights
holders, prioritization upon order of perfection of rights, or perhaps,
limitation to the holder that triggered the complaint. 299 Finally, the
court left undescribed the circumstances that would trigger an ad-
ministrative or judicial reevaluation of an allocation decision that
had been made with prior consideration of public trust concerns.3°°
If nothing else, the unanswered questions implicitly posed by
National Audubon Society have greatly unsettled the expectations
previously enjoyed by California's water rights holders. Even if
subsequent decisions address the unanswered questions suggested
above, the extension of the public trust doctrine into heretofore
uncharted waters clearly comes at the expense of water rights holders.
The ultimate question left unanswered by National Audubon Society
is whether the state's belated assertion of trust interests to the
detriment of water rights holders may go uncompensated. 30, Since
the entire tenor of National Audubon Society suggests that California
would not compensate a public trust influenced reallocation, a Cal-
ifornia water rights holder can likely look only to the federal Con-
stitution for possible relief.302
298. In addition to appropriative rights, California recognizes riparian, prescriptive, and
pueblo rights. See, e.g., W. HuTcmNs, supra note 22.
299. See Unsettled Law, Unsettled Rights, supra note 269, at 15-16.
300. "The Audubon court articulated neither limitations, any framework for applying
collateral estoppel principles, nor any threshold test for the sufficiency of any 'changed
conditions."' Unsettled Law, Unsettled Rights, supra note 269, at 17.
301. As described above in Illinois Central Railroad, the Supreme Court suggested that
compensation would have to be made for the value of any improvements taken as a result of
the revocation of the state's grant of submerged lands. See supra notes 277-84 and accompa-
nying text. At the very least, this dicta suggests that the City of Los Angeles has a claim to
the value of any improvements made useless as a result of a reallocation of water. See also
City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 515, 606 P.2d 362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
302. See infra notes 303-49 and accompanying text.
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VII. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RETREAT FROM PROTECTION OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY INTERESTS IN WATER: PROLOGUE TO A TAKINGS ANALYSIS
The extension of California's police powers over private property
in water parallels similar legislative and judicial alterations of private
property in water in other states. 303 Other states have also asserted
broadened public trust interests over water resources. 3°w While a few
early police power cases did invalidate legislative attempts to modify
private property interests in water, 0 5 the vast majority of courts have
approved extensive modifications or eliminations of private rights
and property without payment of compensation." 6 Although these
police power cases stretch back to the early yelrs of this century, to
date the United States Supreme Court has not squarely addressed
the limits of a state's power to adjust private interests in water,
without compensation. 0 7 Similarly, no United States Supreme Court
303. Most of the limitations have involved legislative retrenchment from the riparian
doctrine. Oregon's 1909 Water Appropriations Statute provides the general model. 1987 Or.
Laws 539.010-240. Among other things, this statute required all water users to obtain appro-
priative permits and limited theretofore vested riparian rights to the quantities of water actually
beneficially used as of the statute's enactment. Id. at 539.010. Subsequently, similar legislation
has been passed in several other states. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. §§ 455A.1.40 (West 1971);
KAN. STAT. AN. §§ 82a-701 to 82a-725 (1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. ch. 46-1-9 (1987);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 90.14.010-.910 (Supp. 1988). Some of these statutes have legislated
forfeitures of vested riparian rights for nonuse over some period of time. See, e.g., WAsH.
REv. CODE AiN. § 90.14.070 (Supp. 1988) (five consecutive years). North Dakota enacted a
statute repealing prior legislative recognition of riparian rights. 1963 N.D. Laws, ch. 419, Sec.
7. See also Comment, Modification of the Riparian Theory and Due Process in Missouri, 34
Mo. L. REv. 562 n.2 (1969) (listing 10 eastern states that had modified riparian law prior to
1969); Note, The Constitutional Sanctity of a Property Interest in a Riparian Right, 1969
VA H. U.L.Q. 327 (1969) [hereinafter The Constitutional Sanctity]; King, Regulation of Water
Rights Under the Police Power, in WATER RESOuRCES AND THE LAW 271 (1958) [hereinafter
King].
304. See cases collected in Lazarus, supra note 263, at 644 n.77.
305. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Draper, 6. N.D. 152, 69 N.W. 570 (1896); St. Germaine Irrigating
Co. v. Hawthorn Ditch Co., 32 S.D. 260, 143 N.W. 124 (1913).
306. See, e.g., Williams v. City of Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 7, rehearing denied, 375 U.S. 936 (1963); State ex rel. Emery v. Knapp,
167 Kan. 546, 555, 207 P.2d 440, 448 (1949); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D.
1968); In re Waters of Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924); Knight v. Grimes, 80
S.D. 517, 127 N.W.2d 708 (1964).
307. Four cases are commonly cited by state courts as indicating the United States Supreme
Court's tacit approval of state redefinition of water rights. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282
U.S. 660, 670 (1931); Boquillas Land & Cattle Co. v. Curtis, 213 U.S. 339 (1909); Hudson
Cty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 356 (1908); United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 202-03 (1899). See, e.g., Peabody, 2 Cal.2d at 366 (citing
Connecticut v. Massachusetts, Hudson County, and Rio Grande Dam); King, supra note , at
292 (citing Connecticut v. Massachusetts, Boquillas and Rio Grande Dam). None of these
cases, however, directly addresses the compensability of a change in a previously recognized,
state created vested water right. Cf. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 204-11 (1900)
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holding has reviewed the takings issues raised by the recent extension
of the public trust doctrine. °0
A complete "takings" analysis for water rights is beyond the scope
of this article. Rather, in the space remaining, we wish to raise some
initial questions which must be addressed by any court that ultimately
confronts a takings challenge to a redefinition of water rights.
A takings or due process analysis begins where this article also
started, with a definition of "property." 309 Within the linguistic
context of the due process and takings clauses, "property's" uncer-
tain meaning31o becomes bound up within the equally fugitive mean-
ings of "due process" and "takings. 31 I Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court has developed several rules about "property" for constitutional
analysis. Principally, the Supreme Court defers to state law for
definitions of property interests. 3 2 This deference to the states' power
to create or define property interests is not, however, absolute. Two
main qualifications exist. First, private expectations under state law
must also be reasonable in light of substantive federal law.31 3 Second,
states may not redefine property interests arbitrarily. For example,
(correlative nature of land owners' rights to underground petroleum resources justified regu-
lation of extraction). See Note, The Constitutional Sanctity, supra note 302, at 327, 333 n.57.
308. The authors. of this article are members of a law firm which represents the City of
Los Angeles in the Mono Lake litigation. Following the California Supreme Court's decision
in National Audubon Society, the city petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari upon the takings issue. A brief filed by the United States Department of Justice,
in opposition to the city's petition argued that the takings issue was not yet ripe. The United
States Supreme Court denied the petition without comment. 464 U.S. 977 (1983). For an
extended analysis of compensation issues arising out of public trust reallocations of water, see
Note, The Fifth Amendment As a Limitation on the Public Trust Doctrine of Water Law, 15
PAc. L.J. 1291 (1984).
309. In addition to the due process and takings cases, the Supreme Court's contracts clause
cases also address the relationship between a state and individuals over control of natural
resources. Cf. Oakes, supra note , at 590-91 (summarizing pre-1970's contracts clause cases).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. This clause prohibits any state from passing laws impairing
contracts. For purposes of this article, we focus solely on the due process and takings cases.
310. The Supreme Court has articulated a generic "property" definition that echoes the
definition in the Restatement of Property.
[Property] denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the citizen's relation t*o [a]
physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it.... [I]t deals with
what lawyers term the individual's "interest" in the thing question. That interest
may comprise the group of rights for which the shorthand term is "a fee simple"
or it may be the interest known as an "estate or tenancy for years," as in the
present instance. The constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest
a citizen may possess.
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1946).
311. See RsnA RxoHrs As PROPERTY, supra note 12, at 143-49.
312. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 266 (1946). See, e.g., United States ex. rel.
T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 279 (1943).
313. Lazarus, supra note 263, at 673-74 (discussing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467
U.S. 986 (1984)).
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in Hughes v. Washington,314 Justice Stewart suggested in a concur-
rence that a sudden judicial redefinition of a common law property
right could itself trigger the due process or compensation provisions
of the federal constitution. 315 Similarly, in Webb's Fabulous Phar-
macies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 3 6 the Court held that neither a state court
nor legislature could redefine property "ipse dixit" without triggering
the fifth amendment prohibitions.
Despite its erstwhile deference to state property law, the Supreme
Court, in cases involving the validity of regulatory activities affecting
property, has developed a "takings" analysis which in part has
federalized the definition of property. The Court has focused upon
the entire "bundle of rights" which constitutes ownership under a
given state's law. Ruling metaphorically, it has refused to find a
compensable taking where only one "strand" or "stick" of the
"bundle" or state created ownership rights has been impaired. 317
Rather, the court in these regulatory cases, has introduced the concept
of "investment backed expectations" as a functional, federal defi-
nition of property. 38 Under this formulation, the Court has asked
whether the government's "interference" with "reasonable" or "dis-
tinct" investment backed expectations has been so egregious as to
warrant compensation. So long as some reasonable return exists, no
"taking" will occur.319
On the other hand, if the character of governmental action is not
"regulatory" but constitutes a physical invasion of the property or
dispossession for public use, the Supreme Court has generally refused
to apply the economic backed expectation approach.320
In short, when the "character of the governmental action," is a
permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly
314. 389 U.S. 290, 295 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
315. But see contra Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,
88 n.32 (1978) ("person has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of the common law."
quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877)). See also Lazarus, supra note 263, at 700-
01.
316. 449 U.S. 155, 164 (1980) ("[a] State by ipse dixit, may not transform private property
into public property without compensation.... ")
317. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 107 S. Ct. 1232, 1239-
40, 1248-50 (1987); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979).
318. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979), the Court discussed
"reasonable investment backed expectations." In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978), the Court mentioned "district investment-backed
expectations." See generally Lazarus, supra note 263, at 672-74.
319. See, e.g., Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (regulation effects a
"taking if owner has no "economically viable use of his land"). Compare state cases cited
supra note (discussing reasonable use in development cases).
320. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 438 U.S. 419 (1982).
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have found a taking to the extent of the occupation without regard
to whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has
only minimal economic impact on the owners.32'
An unexplored issue in the water rights area is whether govern-
mental actions of the type described in this article are "regulatory"
or are more properly characterized as physical invasions. As dem-
onstrated below, this determination is not always easy to make.
Before translating this discussion of property rights in California
water into "takings" language, two interrelated problems that often
arise in any such discussion deserve attention. The first problem can
be called the "water-is-different syndrome. ' 322 This label addresses
the host of commonly held beliefs that water's status as a fluid, or
its necessity for life, require different property rules. 32- The second
problem involves a more juristically sophisticated formulation of the
same thesis and can be called the "mere usufruct" syndrome. Under
this rubric, holders of water rights have only a "mere" or "simple"
right of use. 24 Thus, the theory goes, because the bundle of ownership
rights to waters is supposedly less ab initio than rights pertaining to
other property, the state is more justified in removing whatever sticks
in the bundle it had previously vested.32 Upon closer inspection,
however, neither syndrome hold much water as a basis for singling
out holders of water rights to bear the uncompensated burden of
financing social improvements.
Adherents of the "water if different" philosophy point to the
physical differences between water and other natural resources to
justify imposition of different property rules on water. These different
rules have restricted application of market principles to water re-
321. Id. at 458 U.S. at 434-35 (citations deleted).
322. Kelso, The Water-Is-Different Syndrome or What is Wrong with the Water Industry?
3 PROC. Am. WATER RESOURCES A. 176 (1967) [hereinafter Kelso); J. HmsrIFER, J. DE
HAVEN, & J. MLIMAN, WATER SuPPLY: ECONOMICS, TEcsNoLocy, AND Poricy 367-68 (1960)
[hereinafter Water Supply].
323. Kelso, supra note 321, at 177. In particular, unlike other natural resources, rules
governing the allocation of water have not promoted creation of markets for water rights. Id.
See generally O'Brien, Water Marketing in California, 19 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1988) (within this
Symposium); cf. LEE, The Transfer of Water Rights in California 2-4, GoVRNOR'S CoMMissIoN
TO REviEw CALIORNIA VATER RIGHTS LAW (Staff Paper No. 5) (1977).
324. Blackstone states: "For water is a movable, wandering thing and must of necessity
continue common by the law of nature, so that I can only have a temporary transient,
usufructuary property therein." 18 W. BLAcKsToNES COMMENTAR]ES, (emphasis in original),
quoted in, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, supra note , at 15. Blackstone further
describes the "qualified property" interest in fire, light, air and water. 2 BLACKSTONE'S
CoETrARis 395, quoted in WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES, supra note 22, at 15.
325. See supra notes 13-14, 317 and accompanying text.
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sources in favor of rules which limit certainty and transferability.
Ultimately, these different rules lead to ad hoc judicial or adminis-
trative reallocations of water from perceived changes in social needs. 32
Without doubt, water has unique physical attributes. Twenty years
ago, Professor Kelso summarized water's three principal differences
from other resources. 327 First, water has an "externality" feature:
"Because it flows, quantity and quality changes resulting from its
use at one place and time may affect other users at other places and
times.'321 Second, water has a "cyclic peculiarity:" "Because water
is generally not consumed in use, because it enters readily into the
soil and the atmosphere, and because it flows, its supply is generally
replenished continuously and may be used repeatedly though fre-
quently only with quality deterioration. ' 329 Finally, water has a
''collective consumption property:" "Because many of the products
of water use are available without restraint to everyone in a position
to use them, the producer of those products cannot withhold them
from consumption until he 'gets his price' as can the producer of
most other natural resource products. ' 330
Nothing in these physical attributes, however, by itself requires
that a system of water rights, and an owner's expectations, develop
differently from any other system of rights in natural resources. More
importantly, nothing within these physical attributes justifies an
American state that has once created or recognized private property
rights in water from modifying, reallocating or abandoning those
rights without payment of compensation.
Equally unavailing to defeat investment backed expectations is an
appeal to water's necessity for life. Water is no more essential to
life than food. One could hardly argue with impunity that a state
may send its sheriff into someone's kitchen in order to seize food
without compensation for redistribution to the needy. Similarly, land
is absolutely essential for all human activities. Yet, as Hirshleifer
noted, a statute unilaterally changing the common law and making
all land public property would be laughable. 33'
326. See generally VATER RIGHTs (T. Anderson ed. 1983) (advocating development of market
alternatives for allocation of water resources).
327. Kelso, supra note 322, at 178.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 179-80.
331. See, e.g., Herminghaus, 200 Cal. at 125, 252 P.2d at 625 (quoting In re Waters of
Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065, 1087 (1924)) ("simple usufruct"); English v. County
of Alameda, 70 Cal. App. 3d, 226, 243-44, 138 Cal. Rptr. 634, 645 (1977) (right to reside in
tax exempt property) ("mere usufruct").
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A corollary to the "water is different" syndrome is the argument
that owners of water rights hold "mere" or "simple" usufructs.332
Because water fights owners hold only the right to use and enjoy the
fruits of their uses of waters, the argument goes, the state may
reappropriate water at its whim without payment of compensation
to the water rights owners.333
In this simple form, the argument breaks down upon closer in-
spection. Nothing within the nature of a "usufruct" itself mandates
such a result. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has used "usu-
fruct" in the same breath as "vested right." 334 Although usufructuary
rights are most frequently associated with rights in watercourses, they
also arise in other contexts. For example, a leasehold has been
equated with a usufruct.3 35 In addition, profits-a-prendre are in
essence usufructuary rights.3 36 They grant the holder no right of
possession in land but only the right to come upon and harvest
timber or mine minerals. It would be unthinkable that a grantor of
a profit could unilaterally take back the grantee's right and leave the
grantee no remedy. 337 Similarly, a life estate in property is merely a
332. See, e.g., Note, When the Well Runs Dry: A Proposal for Change in the Common
Law of Ground Water Rights in Massachusetts, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AsF. L. REv. 445 (1982)
(contrasting usufructuary rights with "proprietary" rights):
Usufructuary rights have advantages over ownership rights.... [U]sufructuary rights
avoid the "taking" problem potentially created when regulatory legislation limits a
landowner's rights to withdraw water. If the prevailing legal scheme vests actual
ownership of ground water instead of protecting rights to the use of water, regulation
of ground water withdrawal may raise constitutional problems. By defining the rights
as usufructuary, the constitutional issue does not arise.
Id. at 461 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). The author of the Note cited no authority for
the last sentence quoted above.
333. See, e.g., Note, supra note 331.
334. In Dannenbrink v. Burger, 23 Cal. App. 587, 595, 138 P. 751, 754-55 (1913), the
court stated: "it follows that the waters so escaping from the Waste [sic] ditch... having
been appropriated and for about twenty-five years used and applied by the defendants to a
beneficial purpose, they thus acquired a vested right or usufruct therein of which they cannot
now justly be divested by the plaintiffs." (emphasis added.)
335. See State v. Moore, 12 Cal. 56, 70 (1859).
336. See, e.g., 4 B. WrrKiN, SutraY oF CALiFoRNiA LAW § 439, at 620 (9th ed. 1987)[hereinafter B. WrrKiN) ("[A] right to take something from the land of another, either a part
of the soil or its products") (emphasis in original). One common profit is an exclusive oil
lease. Id. § 737, at 919. Oil leases have been described as usufructs. See, e.g., Graciosa Oil
Co. v. Santa Barbara County, 155 Cal. 140, 143, 99 P. 483, 485 (1909). See also Smith v.
Cooley, 65 Cal. 46, 48, 2 P. 880, 881 (1884) (mining rights as usufructs); McCord v. OaklandQuicksilver Mining Co., 64 Cal. 134, 141, 27 P. 863, 865 (1883) (mining rights as usufructs).
But see Richardson v. Callahan, 213 Cal. 683, 684, 3 P.2d 927, 928 (1931) (comparing oil and
gas indenture with "mere" usufruct).
337. In California, and in jurisdictions following the Restatement of Property, remedies
for interference with an interest under a profit are the same as those for interference with an
easement. B. WX'KiN, supra note 336, § 439, at 620.
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usufructuary right. 38 Again, however, once granted, such a usufruct's
grantee is not without relief should the grantor attempt unilaterally
to take back the grant. In both of the above examples, it is even
more apparent that a state has no justification to seize without
compensation either the profit or the life estate and dedicate it to
the public good solely because such rights are "mere" usufructs.
Thus, it is not the "mere" usufructuary nature of the water right
that allegedly authorizes uncompensated reallocation of water rights.
Rather the argument that the nature of water rights authorizes greater
state intervention without compensation flows from the states' pur-
ported "ownership" rights in their waters.3 39 Whatever the ultimate
determination of state claims to pre-existing but previously undis-
posed state title,340 such arguments have nothing to do with the
usufructuary nature of a water right. Furthermore, by themselves,
they do not justify curtailing a water right, such as through Califor-
nia's 1928 Amendment, 34' upon police power grounds. Rather, the
long history of cases describing "mere" usufructs should simply be
understood as distinguishing nights of use from ownership of the
corpus of a body of water. Thus, nothing about a "usufruct"
authorizes an uncompensated judicial redefinition of the usufructuary
right.
As described above, California courts have redefined heretofore
vested property rights in several ways. Prediction of the rights to
compensation arising out of these redefinitions is uncertain, however,
since the court's analysis proceeds case by case. 342 Absent a specific
338. See, e.g., In re Shaw's Estate, 198 Cal. 352, 363, 246 P. 48, 52 (1926) (trust beneficiary
received life interest in usufruct of trust corpus); Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Duffill, 191 Cal.
629, 648, 218 P. 14 (1923) (quoting Gray v. Union Trust Co., 171 Cal. 637, 640, 154 P. 306,
308 (1915)) (trust beneficiary's usufruct). See also Richards v. Donner, 72 Cal. 207, 209, 13
P. 584, 585 (1887) (grantor sought right of control and usufruct during his life).
339. See generally Note, Water Rights: A Question of Ownership, 10 ,VAsHB RN L.J. 465
(1971); Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAIn'. L. REv. 638
(1957). Walston argues that a state's public trust obligations arising out of sovereignty over
its waters, in effect, mandate a state to allow only nonvesting usufructuary rights in its waters.
Walston supra note 269, at 83-88. Walston's argument, however, ignores the history of
usufructuary rights in water. Water rights were not traditionally viewed as grants by the
sovereign of a sovereign's resource. Rather, the usufructuary principle arose out of the
distinction between ownership of the corpus and ownership of the use of water. Walston has
improperly elevated this civil and common law distinction into an essential attribute of
sovereignty. At least one civil law commentator, however, has questioned the civil law's ancient
conclusion that the corpus of certain resources, such as water, cannot properly be "owned."
See Yiannopoulos, supra note 25, at 699-700.
340. See, e.g., State Reserved Water Rights, supra note 166.
341. See supra notes 167-90 and accompanying text.
342. See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., Inc. 452 U.S. 264,
294-96 (1981); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979).
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factual context, few conclusions can be reached in the abstract.
Moreover, the two extreme situations contemplated by the Racanelli
and National Audubon Society decisions have not yet been reduced
to a specific factual context; rather, the courts in those two decisions
have merely announced reallocation principles for future application
to specific water rights disputes.
With the above qualifications in mind, it is nevertheless possible
to sketch several different factual scenarios arising after the Racanelli
and National Audubon Society decisions and suggest how the differ-
ent scenarios call for different results under the federal Constitution's
due process and takings challenges. The simplest scenario envisions
a dispute between appropriators. Assume that the prior appropriator
is a farming family that has appropriative rights dating back to the
Gold Rush. The family uses 600 acre feet of water per year to raise
non-surplus crops at a profit on their 200 acres of Class I agricultural
land. Further assume that the farmers use state-of-the-art technology
to maximize their water use efficiency. Now assume that a large
municipality also appropriates water from the same river as the farm
family. The municipality's rights arose after the farming family's
rights. The 600 acre-feet of water used by the farming family might
supply the domestic needs of 600 families.
If a drought strikes, may the State Water Board or a court declare
the farming family's agricultural use "unreasonable" and authorize
the municipality to use such rights without compensating the farm
family?343 Surely, if compensation is not made under these circum-
stances, prospects are dim that it would be awarded in any circum-
stance. In this circumstance, declaration of an unreasonable use, or
a trust-based reallocation, would effectively deny the farming family
all return from their water right. Even if such reallocation were
limited to the period of a drought, it appears as a temporary
deprivation of the farming family's entire use of their water right.
In such circumstances, the sudden redefinition of the farming family's
use as "unreasonable" must constitute a taking.
The above situation differs from the early post-1928 amendment
cases since no question arises as to the reasonableness of the farming
family's method of use. By assumption, their use is as efficient as
343. Alternatively, given the public trust doctrine's protection of "commercial" uses of
water, might the state declare that such commercial interests were better served by supporting
the municipal workers, whose economic ouput (we assume) exceeds greatly the farming family's
production?
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possible. Moreover, the scenario assumes a dispute between two
appropriators. As described above, well prior to the 1928 amendment,
a reasonable use limitation appeared between appropriators. Thus,
the 1928 amendment by itself should not affect the outcome of the
above scenario. In no case arising prior to the 1928 amendment,
however, did a court determine that a subsequent appropriator could
take all of a stream's flow to the detriment of any use by a prior
appropriator.
Thus, in this circumstance, absolutely no precedent exists for
authorizing an uncompensated reallocation of the farming family's
vested right. Moreover, under the circumstances sketched above,
fairness requires compensation. The farming family should not have
to shoulder the entire burden of providing water for the urban
dwellers. If the economic value produced by the municipal residents
so greatly exceeds that of the farming family, then it should be no
great cost to the urban dwellers to share with the farming family
some of the benefits derived from their use of the waters. Under
these circumstances, only a bald appeal to an unfeeling utilitarianism
supports an argument that this reallocation go uncompensated. Mere
utilitarian considerations alone, however, do not justify uncompen-
sated governmental reallocation of other resources. A reallocation of
water under the above circumstances likewise should not go uncom-
pensated.
A slight modification of the circumstances just described will
demonstrate how difficult it may be to determine in a water rights
context whether the courts should apply the regulatory taking doctrine
(with its investment backed expectations element) or the physical
invasion doctrine (which would grant compensation without regard
to the extent of economic impact on the owner). If the drought needs
of the municipality can be met by temporarily using only one-half
of the farming family's water and if the farming family can make a
small profit with that amount of water (but much less profit than
would be made if all the water were available), is the farm family
entitled to compensation?
If the answer to this inquiry is in the negative, one must be
applying the regulatory line of cases and arguing that the farm family
has been left a sufficient number of sticks from their bundle of rights
to defeat a takings claim. 44 One the other hand, if the answer is in
344. If the ability to make some profit with the reduced water supply is eliminated from
the hypothetical, the farm family should be entitled to compensation even under the regulatory
line of cases.
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the affirmative, one is equating the loss of water with a direct
expropriation of property. In other words, the taking of the water
is treated the same as if the government had taken one half of the
farm family's land for a year for some proper governmental purpose.
Which of these approaches will be adopted by the United States
Supreme Court when a proper case reaches it is unknown at this
time. However, Joslin's and Racanelli's utilitarian allocation ap-
proach to water rights will certainly engender some significant test
cases.
A public trust based reallocation of water might also not implicate
the regulatory takings cases with their investment backed expectations
language. National Audubon Society was premised not on the police
power but on a pre-existing title held by the state as an aspect of
sovereignty. The primary focus of a takings challenge under the
public trust will likely be whether the state's belated assertion of a
superior title is valid on any grounds or, rather, an artifice to avoid
compensation. Relevant evidence to that validity determination will
likely include both the notice, if any, received by the water rights
holders of the state's paramount interest345 and the prior history of
legislative and judicial conduct towards vested water rights.3 46
It appears that it will be much more difficult to sustain a takings
claim when the use of the water is not challenged, but rather the
method of use is being regulated. At some hypothetical point, how-
ever, regulations governing methods of diversion and use may become
so expensive that they effectively confiscate property and thus con-
stitute a taking. Other than this extreme situation, the Board and
the courts apparently have broad authority to require efficient use
of this vital natural resource. The issue, therefore, in the "methods
of use" arena is much more a matter of policy than it is of law:
How much of the ever increasing expense of conserving the state's
345. See Fifth Amendment Limitation, supra note 270, at 1307-17.
346. This discussion assumes that the state's public trust reallocation attempts to shift
water from a consumptive use to an instream use. The due process and takings analysis might
differ, however, if the state shifts water from one consumptive use to another. The public
trust's commerce prong theoretically supports state supervision of any commercial uses of
water. While the trust purposes normally are focused on nonconsumptive public uses, in theory
the courts could find the public's interest in commerce best subserved by a trust based
reallocation of rights from one private user to another.
If the state proceeds under a commerce guise to shift water from agriculture to industry on
the basis of perceived utilitarian gains, the takings analysis should be identical here with the
police power cases. Clearly, the state has never so extended its trust protected "commerce"
interest as to prefer one consumptive user over another. Such an extension now would constitute
an exteme redefinition of property and trigger a due process analysis.
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waters should be borne by the senior rights holders and how much
should be borne by junior would-be appropriators. Appropriate cost
allocation is the primary inquiry.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Historically, the courts have recognized that judicial decisions
represent the primary way rules of property, and therefore vested
property rights, are created. Once rules of property have been sanc-
tioned by the courts, they become the basis for all social and
economic decisions involving acquisition, use, and transfer of that
property. Therefore, the courts have been hesitant and cautious in
changing the rules and thereby retroactively impacting the reasonable
expectations of property owners. Stare decisis has a special impor-
tance in property law, which was described by the United States
Supreme Court as follows:
Where questions arise which affect titles to land it is of great
importance to the public that when they are once decided they
should no longer be considered open. Such decisions become rules
of property, and many titles may be injuriously affected by their
change .... [W]here courts vacillate and overrule their own deci-
sions .... affecting the title to real property, their decisions are
retrospective and may affect titles purchased on the faith of their
stability. Doubtful questions on subjects of this nature, when once
decided, should be considered no longer doubtful or subject to
change. 347
Early California water law followed this admonition. The cases
decided prior to the late 1960s rejected all arguments that water
should be taken from one user and given to another because of the
greater importance of one of the competing uses. The striking dif-
ference between these earlier cases and the "modern" view can be
graphically demonstrated by comparing, side by side, quotations from
two cases, one decided in 1904 and the other in 1986:
[The riparian] right is a part of the estate of the plaintiff-parcel
in its land,- and whether it is or is not as valuable in a monetary
point of view, or beneficial to the community in general, as would
be the use of a like quantity of water in some other place, it cannot
be taken by the defendants without right, or in the case of a public
use elsewhere, without compensation.3 48
347. Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 3 Wall. 332, 334 (1865).
348. Southern Cal. Inv. Co. v. Wishire, 144 Cal. 68, 73, 77 P. 767, 769 (1904) (emphasis
added).
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The decision [as to which water use to prioritize] is essentially a
policy judgment requiring a balancing of the competing public
interests, one the Board is uniquely qualified to make in view of
its special knowledge and expertise and its combined statewide
responsibility to allocate the rights to, and control the quality of,
state water resources. 349
It is difficult to conceptualize a more fundamental departure from
stare decisis and the traditional rules of property than that evidenced
by the Audubon and Racanelli decisions. California law has truly
moved into an era where water use is viewed as a government granted
privilege to be monitored by the Board and the courts and, when
necessary, reallocated among competing users to achieve the greatest
social good. The questions which remain are: is this good policy and,
if so, can this new order be accomplished without compensation to
those who thought they held vested water rights or will some future
judicial decisions require a reappraisal of the state's reallocation
powers?
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349. United States v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 182 Cal. App. 3d 130, 227 Cal.
Rptr. 161, 188 (1986).
